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Abstract 
 
As autonomous features become pervasive, control strategy research continues.  
Levels of Autonomy (LoA) provide a method for describing function allocation between 
operators and autonomous system elements.  Unfortunately, LoA does not provide the 
user interface designer a clear method to distinguish among interface concepts which 
impose varying levels of operator workload or result in predictable human or system 
performance changes.  This limitation arises as LoA does not distinguish functions which 
impose significant verses insignificant human workload.  For example, a car with 
autonomous emergency breaking performs breaking at the highest Level of Autonomy.   
However, this function does not affect the primary decisions made by an automobile 
driver and automating this function alleviates little, if any, human workload.  The current 
research suggests an alternate classification scheme, specifically Level of Human Control 
Abstraction (LHCA).  LHCA describes how an operator controls a system based on the 
control tasks performed and the level of decisions made by the operator verses the 
system.  This thesis will discuss five levels within this framework: Direct Control, 
Augmented Control, Parametric Control, Goal Oriented Control, and Mission Capable 
Control.  Real world and hypothetical systems can be categorized within this framework, 
potentially providing a framework that is directly related to human workload and 
performance.   
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AND DISCUSSING LEVELS OF HUMAN 
CONTROL ABSTRACTION 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
1. General Issue 
In a document titled “America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future” and signed by 
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Mark A. Welsh, III, several strategic 
directions are proposed for the Air Force.  Among these strategic directions are increased 
investment in game changing technologies; including unmanned systems, and autonomy 
(Welsh, 2015).  This vision is enhanced by a document titled “Autonomous Horizons”, 
signed by then Chief Scientist of the Air Force, Mica Endsley.  Dr. Endsley states that 
this document “describes an evolutionary progression that obtains the best benefits of 
autonomous software working synergistically with the innovation of empowered airmen” 
(Endsley, 2015).  Therefore, design tools which enable the creation of systems which 
support this synergism are necessary. 
For example, robust methods are required to enable the robust control of complex 
modern vehicles and tele-robots when control decisions are shared between the operator 
and the system itself.  In the past, the concept of Level of Autonomy (LoA) has been 
relied upon as a potential method to understand the authority granted to the autonomy 
within human-machine teams.  However, this concept has not provided a robust tool for 
describing or evaluating human-machine systems and has come under significant 
scrutiny.  In 2012 the Defense Science Board (DSB) released a document entitled “The 
Role of Autonomy in the DoD Systems.”  This report recommends that the DoD suspend 
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the use of conceptual frameworks focused on levels of autonomy. Instead this report 
recommends the development of a new framework that: focuses on capabilities, identifies 
which cognitive tasks have been delegated to the human verses the system, and makes 
system level tradeoffs visible (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology Logistics, 2012).  With this guidance, it is clear that a framework is needed 
by the DoD to satisfy these requirements. 
2. Background 
The concept of creating automated systems to has been studied for many years.  
System designers have used automation to improve productivity, efficiency, safety, 
operator workload, and to permit the control of more complex systems (Scerbo, 1996).   
A commonly cited concept within the field of automation is the 10 Levels of 
Automation (LoA) developed by Sheridan.  The levels deal with the amount of decision 
authority the automation has relative to the human (Sheridan, 2011). 
Sheridan’s concept of LoA focuses on the level of authority to make decisions 
allocated to the computer, not the level of detail of the decisions.  This is an important 
distinction because delegating some decisions to a computer may have a large impact on 
the human while others may not.  An example of a system with the highest possible LoA 
is automatic headlights on an automobile which turn on when they detect low ambient 
light.  With this example the system does not require approval from the operator or give a 
veto option to the operator before initiating the headlights.  However, an automatic 
headlight system does not have a very strong impact on the operator’s workload or any 
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other human performance consideration.  The LoA framework fails to categorize systems 
along practical lines which are important to both system operators and system designers.   
3. Problem Statement 
A framework for system categorization which meets the criteria laid out by the 
DSB does not exist.  This lack of a framework creates barriers to research into cognitive 
task allocation as an independent variable and leveraging findings from past research to 
create system improvements (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology Logistics, 2012).   
4. Research Objectives 
The goal of this research is to develop and present a conceptual framework for 
categorizing the control of vehicles and tele-robotics which meets the recommendations 
of the DSB as well as to assess the applicability and usefulness of that framework.  The 
levels of this framework should be defined by the allocation of cognitive functions, and 
decisions, to either the human or the system.  Each level within the framework should 
have an additional layer of decision making reallocated to the system from the human.  
The framework should be structured to empower designers and decision makers with the 
capability to make system level tradeoffs more visible. 
5. Methodology Overview 
The methodology of this research has two aspects, first to establish the breadth of 
applicability of the proposed conceptual framework and second to show the framework 
makes system level tradeoffs visible. 
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A series of real world systems across several domains were analyzed within the 
framework.  Each system was described in sufficient detail, then each of its control 
configurations were categorized within the framework.  This process demonstrated that 
the framework can be applied to a plethora of systems in use today.  It also served to 
illustrate similarities between systems controlled at the same tier within the framework, 
establishing a justification for conclusions about the cost and benefits related to each 
level. 
Three hypothetical systems which could be configured to operate at each level 
within the framework were also analyzed.  This process served to provide precise 
examples of how a system could be controlled at each tier, solidifying the boundaries 
between each level.  Additionally, traits associated with each level were explored during 
the hypothetical system analysis.   
6. Assumptions 
The proposed conceptual firework is assumed to apply only to vehicles and 
telerobotics.  Other types of systems may benefit from similar analysis on the level of 
detail of operator control inputs.  However, the focus of this research is the control of 
primary motion of vehicles and telerobotics.   
Additionally, an assumption exists that as a vehicle or telerobotic system is 
controlled at a lower level of detail the operator will require less attention to control that 
system effectively.  This assumption was based on knowledge of system control and 
published literature.   
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7. Scope 
This research is confined to introducing the conceptual framework, then 
establishing its usefulness by demonstrating its breadth of applicability and the potential 
relationship between the framework and system performance as well as Human Systems 
Integration (HSI) impacts.  In developing the current conceptual framework, it was 
necessary to make a number of assertions regarding operator attention and workload 
based upon prior experience and published literature; however, verification of these 
assertions were outside the scope of the current research. 
8. Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is organized into six chapters.  The first chapter is an introduction.  
The second chapter is a literature review.  The third chapter introduces the proposed 
framework, defining and describing it.  The fourth chapter describes the methodology for 
demonstrating the framework’s breadth of applicability and ability to make system level 
traits visible.  The fifth chapter contains the analysis of the framework, as well as systems 
analyzed under the framework.  The sixth chapter contains conclusions and 
recommendations for further research.   
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II. Literature Review 
1. Overview 
Automation, autonomy, adaptive automation, and levels of autonomy or 
automation (LoA) are important aspects of vehicle and telerobotic control.  A review of 
these concepts, research in these areas, and methods used for analyzing autonomous 
systems motivated the development of the framework proposed in this research.   
2. Automation Discussion 
Automation has been used across many industries to improve productivity, 
quality, and efficiency.  As Scerbo points out, the aviation industry has successfully used 
cockpit automation, showing effective improvement in flight times, fuel efficiency 
navigation, and pilot perception.  He also states that automation can reduce human 
variability and human errors while increasing operations flexibility and allowing the 
control of more complex systems (1996).  The benefits of automation are numerous, 
obvious, and ubiquitous throughout the modern world.   
As Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) become more ubiquitous, manpower 
demands for controlling those UASs will undoubtedly increase without the development 
of significant innovation.  In “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030” the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) specifically calls for the ability of a single pilot 
to control multiple UASs simultaneously (US DoD, 2005).  There is a myriad of issues 
involved with bringing this vision to reality.  Some of these issues will, no doubt, be 
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resolved with control automation, as Scerbo asserts that more complex systems can be 
controlled through the implementation of automation (1996).   
Overall, automation has many potential benefits to the DoD and society at large.  
However, negative aspects also exist.  A difficult to avoid aspect of automation is the 
potential loss of engagement by the system operator.  As automation increases, the 
operator often changes from actively engaged in controlling the system to monitoring the 
system as the automation performs many primary control tasks.  Regrettably, humans are 
not good at vigilance tasks, such as system monitoring, and this often leads to degraded 
system performance (Parasuraman, 1986).  In addition to struggling with vigilance tasks, 
humans can lose skills associated with manual operation if only automated operations are 
used (Wickens, Hollands, Banbury, & Parasuraman, 2015).  Situation awareness (SA) 
can also deteriorate during the mission as operators are removed from decision loops 
(Scerbo, 1996).  Finally, in some circumstances, operator workload can increase with 
increased automation.  Scerbo states that when a system is automated, in some cases, 
when operations require low supervision the system functions well, but when the system 
is stressed the automation can hinder operations (1996). 
3. Automation and Autonomy Differentiation 
This chapter discusses automation and autonomy in detail, therefore they will 
each be clearly defined.  Unfortunately, the literature in this area is inconsistent on the 
use of these terms.  Specifically, some articles within the literature apply the term “level 
of automation” (Sheridan, 2011) while others apply the term “level of autonomy” when 
discussing a single framework known as LoA (Proud, Hart, & Mrozinski, 2003).  Vagia’s 
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thorough literature review paper provides the following definitions and strategies for 
differentiation of these terms.  Automation describes a system that completes a task 
previously completed by a human, while autonomy refers to the capability of a system to 
determine the proper course of action and execute that action without operator 
intervention (Vagia, Transeth, & Fjerdingen, 2016).  
This intermixing of definitions within the literature is important to discuss 
because in this research, as with Vagia’s literature review, the term level of autonomy is 
used even though the previous researchers themselves used either the phrase “level of 
autonomy” or “level of automation”.  This is done because the researchers were referring 
to the same concept and it allows for easier comparison of taxonomies proposed by 
researchers.  References to the term autonomy or automation independent of the phrase 
LoA will adhere strictly to the definition given by Vagia and colleagues. 
4. LoA from Literature 
The first pioneers of the concept of LoA were Sheridan and Verplank.  Their 1978 
paper laid the foundation for this concept (Sheridan & Verplank, 1978).  Later in his 
2011 literature review Sheridan more clearly explains the levels, as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 - Sheridan's LoA 
Level Description 
1 The computer offers no assistance: Human must take all decisions and actions 
2 The computer offers a complete set of decision/action alternatives 
3 Narrows the selection down to a few 
4 Suggests one alternative 
5 Executes that suggestion if the human approves 
6 Allows the human a restricted time to veto before automatic execution 
7 Executes automatically, then necessarily informs the human 
8 Informs the human only if asked 
9 Informs the human only if it, the computer, decides to 
10 The computer decides everything and acts autonomously, ignoring the human 
(Sheridan, 2011) 
A reader will note that each level of Sheridan’s 10 LoAs increases the amount of 
decision authority allocated to the automated agent, and similarly decreases the 
requirement for operator approval of those decisions.  At level 1, the agent does nothing, 
at level 10, the agent does everything.  In between, the agent needs less and less approval 
before initiating an action.  That is, the agent is assigned increasing levels of autonomy 
for making and executing a decision.   
Although many researchers have tried to create taxonomies describing levels of 
autonomy and automation (Clough, 2002; Draper, 1995; Endsley, 1987; Endsley & 
Kaber, 1999; Endsley & Kiris, 1995; Lorenz et al., 2001; Ntuen & Park, 1988; Proud et 
al., 2003; Riley, 1989; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978), Sheridan and Verplank were the 
first.  Subsequent attempts to define the levels are based on their concept of allocating 
additional decision authority to the agent, and similarly reducing the need for operator 
approval of those decisions.  There are two notable exceptions to this, they are Chen, 
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Haas, & Barnes (2007) and  Milgram, Rastogi, & Grodski (1995), who partitioned the 
decision space differently as discussed in section 4.2.   
Following Sheridan, Endsley’s 1987 taxonomy applies four LoA.  Endsley uses 
the phrase “Allocation of Roles Between the Expert System and The Pilot” to name these 
levels. The levels include:  
Level 1:  the system makes recommendations to the pilot which he may 
choose to act on,  
Level 2:  the system makes recommendations which it will carry out if the 
pilot concurs,  
Level 3:  the system makes recommendations which it will carry out unless 
the pilot vetoes, or  
Level 4:  the system acts in an automatic fashion with the pilot completely 
out of the loop. 
(Endsley, 1987) 
Interestingly, in a 1999 paper by Endsley and Kaber, while citing this 1987 paper 
Endsley reiterates this taxonomy, but titles it as a LoA hierarchy, labeling each level, 
providing a slightly different definition of each level, and including a fifth level.  The 
reiterated taxonomy is: 
Level 1:  manual control - with no assistance from the system;  
Level 2:  decision support - by the operator with input in the form of 
recommendations provided by the system; 
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Level 3:  consensual artificial intelligence (AI) - by the system with the 
consent of the operator required to carry out actions; 
Level 4:  monitored AI - by the system to be automatically implemented 
unless vetoed by the operator; and 
Level 5:  full automation with no operator interaction. 
(Endsley & Kaber, 1999) 
The reader will note that Endsley’s 1987 taxonomy is quite similar to Sheridan 
and Verplank’s taxonomy. Endsley uses maximum and minimum levels with manual 
control and fully autonomous control, just as Sheridan, but with fewer intermediate 
levels.  These similarities between Endsley’s and Sheridan’s levels carry throughout later 
iterations of LoA taxonomies created by these and other researchers (Vagia et al., 2016). 
 The concept of LoA has also been applied to different aspects of a task.  In their 
paper, Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens examine tasks at a detailed level, using the 
four-stage model of human information processing.  The four stage model consists of 
sensory processing, perception/working memory, decision making, and response 
selection.  They state that each of the four stages can be assigned to a system and 
automated.  When the stages are assigned to a system, the resulting functions are 
correspondingly named: information acquisition, information analysis, decision and 
action selection, and action implementation.  When these functions are automated the 
types of automation are referred to as: acquisition automation, analysis automation, 
decision automation, and action automation.  Their analysis separates a task into subtasks 
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associated with each of the stages.  Furthermore, they examine which of these subtasks 
should be allocated to either the human or the system.   
5. Effects of LoA from Literature 
Several studies have been conducted on the effects of LoA on workload and 
system performance (Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Kaber & Endsley, 2004).  Kaber and 
Endsley’s 2003 study found that the LoA was the most important factor in determining 
performance and SA.  Kaber and Ensley state that LoA was an important influence on 
task performance and situational awareness (SA).  At the low end of the LoA spectrum 
performance improved while at the high end SA was improved (Kaber & Endsley, 2004). 
From Kaber and Endsley’s study one sees that the interactions between LoA, SA, 
performance, and workload are not simple and straightforward.  In their 1999 and 2003 
research, Kaber and Endsley used yet another taxonomy of LoA with 10 levels.  For 
brevity this taxonomy will not be fully described, but their chosen taxonomy is similar to 
Sheridan and Verplank’s original 1978 LoA taxonomy.  Their research shows that as 
LoA increases; workload remains stable, SA is degraded, and overall system performance 
improves.  However, this only held true up to intermediate LoAs.  They state that the 
physical implementation of the operator’s decisions was advantageous while performance 
was reduced when higher level cognitive tasks were allocated to the system (Endsley & 
Kaber, 1999).  Endsley & Kaber posit that the reason for poorer performance when 
automating higher level cognitive functions was the operator’s loss of focus on task 
execution and the self-doubt in their own decisions.   
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6. Alternative Related Taxonomies from Literature 
All of the LoA taxonomies so far described deal with the authority given to the 
system with respect to the level of approval the operator provides over the system’s 
decisions.  These taxonomies do not directly address the level of detail of decisions 
allocated to the system or what decisions remain with the operator.  This is a problem 
because in many modern systems, especially when real time operation is critical, 
Sheridan’s LoA would be 10 for many component technologies even though the operator 
is still responsible for making decisions to control the systems on a moment to moment 
basis.  Importantly, the LoA framework fails to differentiate along lines which have a 
meaningful effect on system performance and the amount of operator attention required 
for proper system control.   Ideally, a framework would differentiate such that the highest 
level on the scale corresponded with a dramatically reduced workload and overall 
demand placed on the operator for system control.   
The fact that component technologies can operate at level 10 even though the 
operator remains critical in the control loop can be easily illustrated.  For example, once 
set, the cruise control on a car does not request permission to adjust the throttle to 
maintain speed up a hill, it simply increases power as necessary.  In this example the 
operator is still fully engaged in the task of driving, both selecting the proper vehicle 
speed and making steering control inputs, but the lower level task of setting the proper 
throttle valve position has been fully automated.  There are many examples of low level 
tasks that have been completely delegated to systems operating at Sheridan’s LoA 10, but 
the operator remains heavily engaged with the operation of the system.  Consequently, 
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the effect of the automation on the operator’s overall workload is limited.  A framework 
has not yet been discussed that describes the important aspect of level of detail of control, 
or level of control abstraction.   
Milgram discusses a different taxonomy that focuses on the level of control which 
is automated.  Within his paper, Milgram refers to this taxonomy as both “Levels of 
Autonomy” and “Taxonomy of autonomy in remote operations.”  Milgram’s work 
examines the control of robots, decomposing the level of control into five levels.  At the 
lowest level, Manual Teleoperation, the operator remains completely in the loop; making 
every decision and controlling every motion performed by the robot.  At Level 2, 
Telepresence, Milgram suggests “some form of master-slave control system, where all 
actions of the master arm initiated by the human operator are mimicked by the slave 
manipulator” (1995).  That is, the human operator communicates exactly how the robot 
should move, then the robot determines the servo inputs required to achieve that 
movement.  Level 3 is Direct/Agent Control, with “the human operator acting as a 
director of the task performance and the telerobot serving as the agent” (Milgram et al., 
1995).  At this level of control, the human operator provides specific, task level, 
instructions to the robot, which the robot then performs.  Supervisory Control is 
Milgram’s next level where “the human remains in the loop but has no authority to 
act.”(Vagia et al., 2016).  Unfortunately, Milgram fails to clearly define Supervisory 
Control, as does Vagia in her 2016 review of his work.  One possible interpretation of 
Supervisory Control might be a system where the human operator provides goal level 
instructions to the robot, without taking direct control of the robot to accomplish those 
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goals.  Milgram is also vague regarding his highest level of control, Autonomous 
Robotics, but Vagia describes this level as “the human gets out of the loop” (2016).  This 
could be taken to mean that the autonomous robot must interpret its environment to 
decide upon the goals it must achieve and the works to achieve these goals.  Figure 1 
provides a graphical depiction of Milgram’s LoA taxonomy.   
 
Figure 1 - Milgram’s Taxonomy of Autonomy in Remote Operations, adapted from 
original paper (Milgram et al., 1995) 
 
Another way of thinking about LoAs relating to teleoperation is depicted in a 
figure by Chen, which has been reproduced in Figure 2  (Chen et al., 2007).  Chen does 
not directly propose a new taxonomy; however, this graphic includes three different types 
of control.  Chen also does not refer to the different types of control as different LoA or 
even suggest a hierarchy.  In fact, Chen provides this as a control structure for a human 
operator where the human operator is able to exercise different levels of control, 
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depending upon their needs (Chen et al., 2007).  For example, such a control scheme 
might enable to human operator to balance their workload and their need for precise 
control. 
 
Figure 2 – Graphic based on Chen’s Teleoperation Graphic (Chen et al., 2007) 
  
One possible interpretation of the three control types which Chen calls “Direct 
Control,” “Semiautonomous Control,” and “Autonomous Control” will be described here.  
Direct Control is the operator determining the exact position and movements of the 
system.  Semiautonomous Control is the operator setting small incremental goals for the 
system to accomplish (i.e., specifying precise tasks to be performed).  Autonomous 
Control is the operator assigning goals to the system, then permitting the system to 
determine how to achieve those goals (Chen et al., 2007). 
Milgram and Chen’s work is included here for two reasons, first to give an 
alternative conceptual viewpoint of LoA from the literature and second because they 
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approach the concept of level of control abstraction that this research focuses on. Neither 
of these two researchers directly discuss a generalized framework for discussing the level 
of operator control, but their ideas about control occurring at different levels of task detail 
are incorporated within the proposed framework.   
7. Adaptive or Adaptable Automation 
An important concept to discus in the context of automation, and especially LoA, 
is adaptive or adaptable automation.  Adaptive automation is a system in which the 
automation adjust over time due to inputs form the operator or the environment 
(Sheridan, 2011).  Scerbo states that adaptive automation enables the control tasks 
delegated to the system or the operator to change with time (1996).  Vagia points out that 
some of the human performance issues associated with automation, including 
complacency as well as reduction in both situational awareness and operator skill, can be 
reduced or resolved by implementing adaptive automation (2016). 
One issue with adaptive automation is knowing when to apply it.  A concept for 
adaptive automation includes monitoring human performance for degradation and 
increasing automation as performance decreases has been experimented with (Scerbo, 
1996).  Unfortunately, this concept has the flaw of being reactive, that is, the system can 
only implement adaptive automation once performance has degraded.  Another approach 
adapts automation based on workload, which is useful because it can be anticipated 
situationally (Scerbo, 1996).  For example, a pilot expects to have higher workload 
during takeoff and landing than during the cruise phase of flight.   
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The agent that would determine what LoA is appropriate for any given situation is 
referred to as an allocation authority (Sheridan, 2011).  That entity would use one of the 
methods described to determine the appropriate LoA for the current situation, and then 
perform “dynamic function allocation” to adjust the division of labor between the 
operator and the system (Vagia et al., 2016).   
The concept of Adaptive Automation is important to consider because if 
implemented a system’s function allocation and LoA are not static.  This adaptive 
automation adds an additional layer of complexity to the concept of LoA and may add 
additional utility to systems which implement it.  A framework for considering adaptive 
automation and various trigger methods has been provided by Feigh and colleagues.  This 
framework provides a discussion of alternative triggers for adaptive automation (Feigh, 
Dorneich, & Hayes, 2012) . 
8. Evaluation of a Framework 
In his 2014 paper “Why the Fitts list has persisted throughout the history of 
function allocation” de Winter analyzes Fitts list of 11 statements to be used in 
determining proper functional allocation between either a human or a machine (de Winter 
& Dodou, 2014; Fitts, 1951).  To conduct the analysis de Winter treats Fitts list as a 
scientific theory, evaluating it against a list of six criteria which were originally 
developed for the cognitive sciences by Jacobs and Granger (Jacobs & Grainger, 1994).  
These criteria were later used by Pitt et. al. to pick between alternative theoretical 
explanations of scientific observations (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002).  De Winter argues 
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that by evaluating Fitts list as a scientific theory for functional allocation the same six 
criteria can be used to assess Fitts list.  Those criteria are stated in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Framework Evaluation Criteria 
Criteria Description 
Plausibility Are the assumptions of the model plausible? 
Explanatory adequacy 
Is the theoretical explanation reasonable and consistent with what is 
known? 
Interpretability Do the model and its parts make sense? Are they understandable? 
Simplicity 
Does the model capture the phenomenon in the least complex 
manner? 
Descriptive adequacy Does the model provide a good description of observed data? 
Generalizability  
Does the model predict well the characteristics of new, as yet 
unobserved data? 
(de Winter & Dodou, 2014) 
As this method has been applied to analyze Fitts’ list as a scientific theory, this 
same analysis method could be applied to evaluate any proposed framework as a 
scientific theory. 
9. Conclusion 
The concept of LoA is one which has many aspects.  Numerous researchers have 
created LoA taxonomies focused on how much authority a system has over its area of 
control, but there has been very little analysis on the effects of the level of detail of 
control.  As noted by the 2012 DSB cited earlier, the LoA framework does not focus on 
capabilities, cognitive functional delegation between the operator and the system, or 
make system level trades visible (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Technology Logistics, 2012).  Further, increases in LoAs do not necessarily 
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imply decreases in human workload, improvements in human SA, or improvements in 
human performance.  Therefore, there is a need for an alternate classification method 
which addresses a portion of these shortcomings of the existing frameworks.   
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III. Conceptual Framework Proposal 
This chapter focuses on proposing a conceptual framework for identifying 
cognitive functional responsibilities between a system and an operator as suggested by 
the DSB with the goal of defining a hierarchy which is expected to differentiate systems 
based upon the degree of human attention required.  The proposed conceptual framework 
examines this subject from a human-centric, as opposed to system-centric, perspective.  
The framework focuses on how an operator is controlling a system rather than a 
classification for the system itself.  Levels within the framework are differentiated by the 
level of detail of control inputs made by the operator and are not dependent on system 
specifications.  The appropriate level of detail for the control inputs an operator provides 
is an important aspect of system design.  The level of detail of control inputs may affect 
both operator workload and overall system performance.  In addition, different types of 
tasks require different levels of detail of control.   
Several informal frameworks for describing the level of detail for control inputs 
have been proposed (Chen et al., 2007; Endsley, 2015; Milgram et al., 1995).  The goal of 
this research is to present and analyze a conceptual framework which satisfies the 
recommendations of the DSB. This framework should also facilitate the research and 
analysis of the level of detail of operator control inputs for vehicle and tele-robotic 
systems.   
1. Theory 
There have been several attempts to describe the level of detail of operator control 
inputs in the past.  The three proposals were given by Chen, Milgram, and Endsley.  Each 
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proposal provided a means of describing the control of systems, permitting the human 
operator to relinquish detailed control of the system under specific conditions (Chen et 
al., 2007; Endsley, 2015; Milgram et al., 1995).   
Chen’s proposal was very informal and, as noted in the previous chapter, was 
presented through a figure within her paper on tele-operated robots.  A modified version 
of this figure is shown in Figure 2 (Chen et al., 2007).  The figure includes three “control 
options” and discussion of the figure within Chen’s article included a recommendation 
for the appropriate option to use if obstacles or safety issues were present.  The first 
option was “Direct Control”, which included the descriptive terms manual and 
teleoperations.  The second “Semiautonomous Control,” was described as planning way 
points.  The third option was “Autonomous Control” which included the descriptive 
terms algorithmic and supervise mission.  Chen did not provide any additional detail to 
describe these control levels and did not propose a classification framework for control.  
In fact, Chen’s use of roughly defined terms for discussion of this topic illustrates the 
current requirement for a conceptual framework describing levels of the detail of control.   
Milgram proposed a “Taxonomy of autonomy in remote operations” which has 
five levels and ranges from “Manual Teleoperation” to “Autonomous Robotics” 
(Milgram et al., 1995).  Milgram includes a brief description of each level within the 
taxonomy shown in Figure 1.  In this taxonomy, each increase in the level along the 
continuum implies a corresponding decrease in the level of detail the operator must 
provide to control the tele-robot.   
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Endsley proposed a taxonomy of “Control Granularity” as an aspect of a system’s 
autonomy (Endsley, 2015).  Each level of control given requires a different level of detail 
of instructions from the operator.  Endsley predicts that operator workload should 
decrease at higher levels of control granularity (Endsley, 2015).  Figure 5 below shows a 
diagram from “Autonomous Horizons” published by the USAF Office of the Chief 
Scientist, which illustrates Endsley’s Control Granularity framework.   
 
Figure 3 – Endsley’s Control Granularity (Endsley, 2015) 
 Milgram and Endsley’s proposals each suggest a description of human control 
granularity in which systems are classified based upon processes which roughly align 
with the granularity of control undertaken by the operator to control the system.   
2. A Framework for Analyzing Level of Human Control Abstraction (LHCA) 
The purpose of developing a conceptual framework for describing the level of 
detail for operator control inputs is two-fold.  First, to develop a vocabulary from which 
to describe, discuss, understand, and contrast different systems of control.  Second, a 
conceptual framework can be used to make predictions about the human performance 
effects of a control system during the design phase.  Therefore, any useful conceptual 
framework must be able to classify different levels of control and there must be 
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characteristic traits associated with each level that apply across various systems and 
ideally across various classes of systems. 
This research proposes the Levels of Human Control Abstraction (LHCA) 
conceptual framework to describe the level of detail for operator control inputs.  The 
framework has five levels, including: 1) Direct Control, 2) Augmented Control, 3) 
Parametric Control, 4) Goal Oriented Control, and 5) Mission Capable Control.  As 
LHCA increases, the level of specificity of control inputs required from the operator 
decreases.   
The LHCA is determined instantaneously based on the level of detail of control 
inputs given by the operator at a specified instant.  As such, this is not a framework for 
classifying a system, but a framework for classifying the level of detail of human control 
required at any moment in time.  A system may permit the operator to interact with it at 
any one of these levels at any moment in time but the LHCA is not, necessarily, a static 
attribute of the system.  Instead, a given LHCA might correspond to a system state or 
configuration, rather than to a system. 
The LHCA are defined as follows:  
LHCA 1 - Direct Control occurs when the operator controls every aspect of the 
system, including actual control surface positions or motor power.  During Direct Control 
the operator provides continuous control inputs and is responsible for all aspects of 
system operation.  Examples of systems that operate at LHCA 1 are 1940s era aircraft or 
the simplest possible fixed wing remote control aircraft.   
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LHCA 2 - Augmented Control occurs when the operator gives control inputs 
commanding desired actions, the system then makes final determinations about control 
surface positions or motor power.  Many, although not all, modern fly-by-wire systems 
are operated with Augmented Control.  During Augmented Control the operator provides 
continuous control inputs and is responsible for guiding the system through maneuvers.  
The system is responsible for interpreting the operator inputs to adjust control surface 
positions or motor power.  Examples of systems that operate at LHCA 2 are an F-117 
Nighthawk or a multi-rotor UAS.   
For clarification, it should also be noted that not all fly-by-wire systems operate 
the same, some are controlled at LHCA 1 and others LHCA 2.  Some simply brake the 
physical connection between the pilot’s controls and the control surfaces, passing the 
control inputs electronically to control surface actuators but not adjusting the inputs for 
environmental data.  This type of non-augmented fly-by-wire system would be an 
example of Direct Control, not Augmented Control because the operator is still 
determining the exact position of the control surfaces and engine settings.  For precision, 
within this research, Direct Control type fly-by-wire systems are referred to as “non-
augmented fly-by-wire” and Augmented Control type fly-by-wire systems are referred to 
as “fly-by-wire.” 
LHCA 3 - Parametric Control occurs when the operator inputs desired parameters 
that the system should meet, the system then uses onboard sensors and control algorithms 
to meet those parameters.  During Parametric Control the operator gives discrete control 
inputs.  The operator is responsible for safety monitoring, including obstacle avoidance, 
 
26 
even when the system is operating correctly without any faults.  An example of a system 
being operated at LHCA 3 is a commercial airliner with autopilot activated.  Examples of 
parameters the operator may input would be altitude, airspeed, heading, waypoints, or a 
combination of these.   
LHCA 4, Goal Oriented Control occurs when the operator inputs desired goals the 
system should meet, the system then makes all required decisions to meet those goals.  A 
goal is a task without follow-on instructions beyond ‘notify operator when complete.’  
During Goal Oriented Control the operator gives discrete control inputs.  The operator's 
monitoring role is reduced to planning the next goal and monitoring for system failures 
as, when functioning properly, the system can complete the goal without further 
guidance.  An example of a system operating at LHCA 4 is a DJI Phantom 4 Pro, a 
commercially available recreational multi-rotor UAS, executing the “ActiveTrack” goal.  
This goal consists of keeping a specified target centered in the camera’s field of view, 
avoiding obstacle collisions, and following the target until “ActiveTrack” is disengaged.   
LHCA 5, Mission Capable Control occurs when the operator enters pre-launch 
mission goals at a level of detail which, when combined with standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and rules of engagement (ROEs), are sufficient to accomplish the 
mission.  At this level, the system operates independently and autonomously after the 
operator initiates the mission.  During Mission Capable Control the operator gives 
discrete control inputs before the mission begins.  The operator has no mandatory 
monitoring role during mission execution.  An example of a system operating at LHCA 5 
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is an autonomous car that travels to a desired location with no inputs from the driver 
other than the desired destination.   
3. Rules and Guidelines for the LHCA framework 
The LHCA is determined instantaneously based on the control inputs and 
responsibilities of the system operator at any given time as a system can transition from 
being controlled at one level to another.  This is a common occurrence that routinely 
happens during the operation of many modern systems.  The transition from one LHCA 
to another can be initiated by either the operator or by the system, triggered by 
predetermined criteria.  An example of one of these transitions across LHCA is the 
initiation of an aircraft’s autopilot system.  Initially, the operator flies the aircraft with 
continuous control inputs, at either LHCA 1 or 2, depending on the system.  The operator 
then activates the aircraft autopilot and begins controlling the aircraft using Parametric 
Control, LHCA 3.  The operator may command a course, an altitude, and an airspeed, the 
autopilot system will manipulate the control surfaces and engine power to meet those 
parameters.   
An example of involuntary, or system controlled, transition across LHCA is the 
activation of an F-16’s Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS).  
During normal flying conditions, with the autopilot disabled, an F-16 is controlled at 
LHCA 2.  Control inputs are given by the operator, then a fly-by-wire system translates 
the inputs, combined with environmental data, such as pressure and airspeed, then sends 
signals to the control surface actuators.  However, if the onboard Auto-GCAS system 
detects an impending ground collision, the aircraft will transition to LHCA 3, Parametric 
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Control.  The system commands the control surfaces to level off the aircraft and maintain 
safe flight parameters.  This transition from LHCA 2 to LHCA 3 can occur without a 
command from the operator.   
As was previously discussed, LHCA is determined based on the level of detail of 
control inputs given by the operator.  A potential area of confusion which must be 
examined closely is the difference between a powered assist to manipulate a system 
verses a less specific control input.  To illustrate the difference, examine the simplest 
remote control aircraft.  The operator controls the aircraft with a transmitter which has 
pair of joysticks, as shown in Figure 4.  The left joystick controls the throttle with 
forward and backward motions, the rudder with left and right motions.  The right joystick 
controls the elevators with forward and backward motions, the ailerons with left and right 
motions.  The remote-control aircraft receives control inputs from the handheld 
transmitter.  The receiver on the aircraft is connected to servos that manipulate the 
control surfaces.  Even though the operator is not physically moving the control surfaces, 
the operator is directly determining their position.  There is not a determination made by 
the remote-control aircraft as to the position of what the control surfaces should be, the 
servo position is entirely determined by the position of the joysticks on the transmitter.  
Therefore, the system is being controlled at LHCA 1, Direct Control, even though there is 
not a physical link between the operator and the control surfaces.   
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Figure 4 – Remote Control Aircraft Transmitter, arrows signal joystick movements, 
modified from (“Vector - vector remote control rc transmitter black icon,” 2017) 
Another situation to be considered in the determination of an operator’s LHCA is 
the manipulation of several controls simultaneously, causing potential confusion about 
the operator’s current LHCA.  This issue is resolved by examining the operator’s most 
detailed control input and assigning the LHCA based on that aspect of control.  Consider 
an operator driving a car equipped with cruise control, but not initially engaged.  The 
driver is operating both the steering wheel and the throttle with a high level of detail, 
directly controlling the steering angle of the tires while simultaneously controlling the 
vehicle’s throttle.  Even if the car has power steering, the car is still being operated at 
LHCA 1 because the power steering is an example of a powered assist to manipulate a 
system.  When the operator engages the cruise control the operator is still directly 
determining the steering angle of the tires, but is now controlling the vehicle’s throttle 
indirectly using the vehicle’s speed as a parameter to be maintained.  The LHCA can be 
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determined by using the most detailed aspect of control.  In this case the LHCA is still 
Direct Control.  
The formalized rules for determining LHCA are: 
1) LHCA is determined instantaneously based on the level of detail of control inputs 
given by the operator.   
2) LHCA is determined by the most detailed control input given by the operator. 
 
4. LHCA Decision Tree 
The decision tree shown in Figure 5 assists in determining an operator’s current 
LHCA.  This decision tree captures the rules and definitions described earlier in this 
chapter.  A user can simply answer each question down the tree until they have arrive at 
the appropriate LHCA.   
 
Figure 5 - LHCA Decision Tree 
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This decision tree should be used to assist in classifying the LHCA a system is 
being controlled with.  For illustrative purposes, examples of systems being operated at 
each LHCA are examined below: 
1) A simple motor boat – A photo of this system is shown in Figure 6 for clarity.  Figure 6 does 
not show the motor boat being controlled at all, however it does illustrate the control 
capabilities of the boat.  The decision tree analysis will assume that the example motor boat is 
being controlled by a single operator traveling from one location to another.   
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?  Answer: Continuous 
control, the operator is giving continuous control inputs for both yaw and motor 
power, the only two possible control inputs.   
b. Question 2: Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo 
position/motor power with a control input?  Answer: Yes, the operator is deciding both 
the exact motor power and exact angle of thrust vectoring.   
c. Based on this analysis, the motor boat is operated at LHCA Level 1, Direct Control. 
 
Figure 6 – A simple motor boat (“Small Motor Boat Waiting Ferry Passengers 
Stock Photo,” 2017) 
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2) Multi-rotor UAV – A photo of this system is shown in Figure 7 for clarity.  The operator of 
this system uses joysticks to control the movement of this UAV.  An internal processor 
receives the joystick inputs and translates them into rotation speeds for each motor.   
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?  Answer: Continuous 
control, the operator is giving continuous control inputs for yaw, pitch, role, and 
throttle. 
b. Question 2: Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo 
position/motor power with a control input?  Answer: No, the operator is inputting 
desired motions for the UAV, but the internal processor is determining the motor 
power for each motor based on those inputs.   
c. The multi-rotor is operated at LHCA Level 2, Augmented Control. 
 
 
Figure 7 – A multi-rotor UAV (“Drone multicopter in field,” 2017) 
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3) A commercial airliner at cruising altitude - During this phase of flight the operator of this 
system typically employs the autopilot system to control the aircraft.  The autopilot system 
has Lateral Navigation (LNAV), Vertical Navigation (VNAV), and auto-throttle capabilities.  
The operator inputs a desired heading, altitude, and air speed then the autopilot acts to 
achieve those parameters.  The operator is still responsible for safety of flight even while the 
autopilot is activated.   
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?  Answer: Exclusively 
discrete control, the operator has given discrete control inputs. 
b. Question 2: Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?  
Answer: Yes, the operator remains responsible for avoiding collisions with other 
aircraft.   
c. The LHCA for a commercial airliner being operated with autopilot is Level 3, Parametric 
Control. 
 
4) A modern car executing an auto-park maneuver - During this phase of operation the operator 
has delegated all aspects of control to achieve the goal of parallel parking to the car.  While 
from a liability standpoint the operator is still responsible for safety, from the perspective of 
task distribution responsibilities the system is responsible for safety monitoring.  The 
operator’s overall mission was to travel from point A to point B not simply to park the car.   
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?  Answer: Exclusively 
discrete control, the operator has given the discrete control input to park the car. 
b. Question 2: Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?  
Answer: No, the operator has simply specified the goal to park the car near the 
current location and the car is responsible for avoiding collisions.   
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c. Question 3: Did the operator direct the system to achieve a goal within the mission or 
complete the entire mission?  Answer: Goal within mission.  The operator specified 
the goal to park the car near the current location, not travel all the way from point 
A to point B.   
d. The LHCA for an automobile executing an auto-park maneuver as described is Level 4, 
Goal Oriented Control. 
5) A mapping UAV - The operator specifies an area to be mapped then hands-off control to the 
vehicle until the UAV has mapped the area.  The UAV will take off, use the global 
positioning system (GPS) to navigate, collect aerial photography of the area, and then return 
to base and land.  The UAV additionally monitors for any obstacles and avoids detected 
obstacles. 
a. Question 1: Is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?  Answer: Exclusively 
discrete control, the operator has given the discrete control inputs by specifying the 
area to mapped. 
b. Question 2: Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?  
Answer: No, the operator has simply input the mission to map the specified area, the 
UAV is responsible for obstacle avoidance.   
c. Question 3: Did the operator direct the system to achieve a goal within the mission or 
complete the entire mission?  Answer: Entire mission.  The operator is hands-off until 
the UAV returns and does not give inputs along the way.   
d. The LHCA of the mapping UAV is Level 5, Mission Capable Control. 
 
These example systems illustrate the use of the LHCA decision tree at each level 
as shown in Figure 5.   
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In summary, this chapter has reviewed the background literature relevant to the 
level of operator control abstraction, defined the LHCA framework, provided a decision 
tree, and a series of examples to clarify this framework as well as illustrated the use of the 
decision tree.   
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IV.  Methodology 
1. Chapter Overview 
The Level of Human Control Abstraction (LHCA) conceptual framework was 
formally introduced in the previous chapter, this chapter will propose a suitable method 
for analyzing the LHCA framework.  The purpose of the LHCA framework is to meet the 
recommendations laid out by the DSB described in chapter 1 (2012).  As a prerequisite to 
those recommendations the framework must also be shown to be applicable to systems in 
use by the DoD.  The analysis served to demonstrate both the LHCA breadth of 
applicability and ability to make system level traits visible.     
It must be shown that a multitude of different vehicle and tele-robotic systems can 
be categorized within the LHCA framework.  It must also be shown to be a precise 
enough framework to describe differences between various operator control 
configurations.  To these ends a series of examples were analyzed using the LHCA 
framework.  These examples were both real world and hypothetical systems.  The real 
world system examples were analyzed to demonstrate that many current vehicle and 
telerobotic systems can be categorized within the LHCA framework.  The hypothetical 
system examples explored the precision of the LHCA framework, illustrating how 
changes in control result in a LHCA reclassification.  The hypothetical systems chosen 
can be configured to be controlled at each LHCA.   
The ability to make system level traits of a control configuration visible, was also 
illustrated through the analysis of the real world and hypothetical system examples.  The 
benefits and disadvantages of using a specific LHCA to control a system was explored.  
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This trade space analysis of LHCA may help system designers to determine the 
appropriate LHCA for the system they are designing.   
With this analysis completed, the LHCA conceptual framework was shown to 
provide a descriptive vocabulary for the level of detail of operator control inputs for 
vehicles and tele-robotic systems.   
2. Analysis of Real World Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework 
A series of real world systems which employ various levels of automation were 
selected and analyzed using the LHCA framework.  One goal of this analysis was to 
illustrate that many systems across many industries, which are controlled in different 
ways can be analyzed within the LHCA framework.  This step was undertaken to 
demonstrate the breadth of the framework’s applicability.  The other goal of this analysis 
was to qualitatively consider the human performance impacts of controlling a system at 
each LHCA.  If a robust index of traits associated with the use of each LHCA were 
developed, system designers could reference the index to make informed design decisions 
with respect to how their system should be controlled.   
The real world systems were selected from across industries, time periods, and 
levels of sophistication.  The LHCA for other systems could also have been analyzed and 
classified, but the selection covered a breadth of control techniques under consideration 
for DoD and related systems. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, LHCA is not necessarily a static trait of a system, but 
an instantaneous description of how a system is being controlled, typically associated 
with one or more system states.  Therefore, each real world system analyzed had a 
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detailed description of each control configuration before the LHCA was assessed.  Some 
systems are not capable of being controlled using more than one LHCA, others can 
change among multiple LHCA circumstantially or as dictated by the operator.  Each 
system analyzed included a list of LHCA an operator can use to control the system as 
well as a description of how the transition is accomplished.   
Specific, brand name systems were chosen for this analysis instead of generic 
systems.  This specificity was required to properly discuss how the system is controlled 
and properly analyze how control decisions were made with the system.  A description of 
how these systems operate was included for each system within the analysis.  A brief 
description of why that system was included and a system overview is given below.  The 
systems analyzed within the LHCA framework are shown in Table 3: 
Table 3 – Real World Systems Analyzed and the LHCAs provided by each system 
based upon the analysis 
Category System Available Levels of Human Control Abstraction 
1 2 3 4 5 
Automotive Volvo XC90 X  X X     
Aircraft 
P-51 Mustang X         
B-2 Spirit   X X     
F-16 Falcon   X X     
Airbus A300-600R   X X     
UAG 
Carnegie Mellon 
University, Humanoid 
Robot Prototype 
  X       
UAV 
DJI Phantom 4   X X X X 
PRENAV Drone 
System         X 
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1) 2017, Volvo XC90.  This automobile has several subsystems that relate to vehicle 
control including power steering, power brakes, automatic traction control, anti-lock 
brakes, cruise control, adaptive cruise control, lane keeping aid, park assist pilot, and 
pilot assist.  This vehicle was chosen because it has many features that affect the 
LHCA, however this vehicle is not an anomaly; most competitive automotive 
manufactures have equivalent systems.  In the Volvo XC90, each of these subsystems 
relating to vehicle control can be active or inactive at any moment in time and can be 
operated in conjunction with several other subsystems, resulting in a large number of 
potential system states.  Each of these features will affect the LHCA differently 
allowing the system to be operated at LHCA 1, 2, or 3.  A discussion of how the 
many different subsystems influence the operator’s LHCA serves to introduce LHCA 
categorization in a context readers are likely familiar with. 
2) 1940, North American Aviation P-51 Mustang.  This aircraft is completely manual 
and can only operate at LHCA 1, Direct Control.  A detailed description of how the 
operator controls this vehicle demonstrates an example of a pre-computer control 
system.   
3) 1989, Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit.  This aircraft is an example of an inherently 
unstable system that cannot be effectively controlled at LHCA 1.  This aircraft is 
described as unstable because, unlike a stable aircraft, if left completely uncontrolled 
after a disturbance it will not return to straight and level flight.  This aircraft is able to 
be flown by hand at LHCA 2, Augmented Control, or operated using an autopilot 
system at LHCA 3, Parametric Control.  In addition, an accident caused by the fly-
by-wire system was analyzed.  This analysis demonstrated a possible disadvantage of 
systems controlled with a LHCA greater than 1. 
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4) 1976, General Dynamics F-16 Falcon.  This aircraft is equipped with a fly-by-wire 
system, an autopilot system, and an automatic ground collision avoidance system 
(Auto-GCAS).  These different control systems will allow this aircraft to be 
controlled at LHCA 2 or 3.  Analysis of the transition between LHCA in this case 
was thought-provoking because the system can automatically transition to LHCA 3 
from LHCA 2 without any input from the operator if certain criteria, such as 
impending controlled flight into terrain, is met.  
5) 1974, Airbus A300-600R.  A specific instance of an accident in this aircraft, the loss 
of China Airlines' Flight 140 on April 26, 1994, was analyzed.  This accident was 
caused because the pilot was incorrect about the LHCA he was operating the aircraft 
with.  The pilot thought he was operating the aircraft with LHCA 2, but in fact, he 
was operating the aircraft with LHCA 3.  This analysis helped illustrate potential 
brittleness of autonomous systems and help to develop a design recommendation 
regarding LHCA transitions.   
6) 2006, Manufactured by Kawada Industries, modified by Carnegie Mellon University 
(CMU) Humanoid Robot Prototype (HRP) (Chestnutt, Michel, Nishiwaki, Kuffner, 
& Kagami, 2006).  This bipedal robot was modified by CMU to operate at LHCA 2, 
Augmented Control.  Analysis of this system will help to demonstrate that the 
important factor in determining LHCA is the operator’s perspective of the control 
inputs, not the sophistication of algorithms used to implement the operator’s control.  
7) 2016, DJI Phantom 4.  This system is a consumer quad-rotor UAS with several 
features enabling it to be operated with LHCA 2, 3, 4, or 5.  The versatility of control 
methods and broad functionality across the LHCA spectrum made it an excellent 
system to analyze.  This analysis illustrated several key aspects of the LHCA 
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framework and served to illustrate the benefits of operating a system at a particular 
LHCA for a given goal. 
8) 2016, PRENAV Drone System.  This system is a cellular transmission tower 
inspection UAS which can only be operated at LHCA 5.  Analysis of this system, 
specifically the design decision to only allow operation at LHCA 5, will illustrate 
how training and liability can affect system design requirements by establishing 
desired LHCA.  This is an important discussion because of a potential new 
generation of UAVs and UAGs operating at LHCA 5 within industry and the DoD.   
 
3. Analysis of Hypothetical Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework 
The analysis of real world systems within the LHCA conceptual framework 
served to illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of operating at a LHCA and provide 
clarifying examples of the distinctions between each LHCA.  The analysis of several 
hypothetical systems which can be operated across the LHCA spectrum demonstrated the 
precise distinction between each LHCA.  Additionally, similar to the real world system 
analysis, the hypothetical system analysis illustrated some benefits and drawbacks of 
each LHCA.  There were three hypothetical systems analyzed.  Each system included a 
configuration which was operated at each LHCA.  The three hypothetical systems were a 
small fixed wing UAV, a bipedal Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), and an explosive 
ordinance disposal (EOD) UGV.   Table 4 shows the control configurations of the 
hypothetical systems which were analyzed. 
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Table 4 - Hypothetical Systems Analyzed 
System LHCA of Control Configuration 
1 2 3 4 5 
Fixed Wing UAV X X X X X 
Bipedal Robot X X X X X 
EOD UGV X X X X X 
 
The hypothetical fixed wing UAV was a small (<10 lb) aircraft with a radio 
receiver, ailerons, elevators, rudder, and an electric motor driving a propeller.  Each of 
the control surfaces were manipulated by electric servos.  The control inputs given by the 
operator as well as required onboard navigational equipment and sensors was dependent 
on the system configuration and tied to the LHCA.  For example, at LCHA 1 the 
autopilot will be disabled and at LHCA 3 the autopilot will be enabled.  This hypothetical 
fixed wing UAV should be considered a baseline to which the other two hypothetical 
systems can be compared.   
The hypothetical bipedal UGV was a five-foot-tall humanoid robot.  The UGV 
has articulated ankle joints, knee joints, and hip joints, as well as arms to assist with 
balance while walking.  The UGV has different systems onboard to enable control at each 
LHCA just as the hypothetical UAV does.  The selected control configuration affects the 
subsystems such as optical sensors, gyroscopes, and GPS which allow the system to 
operate at each LHCA.  Analysis of this bipedal UGV allowed consideration of how a 
complex, unstable system might be controlled at each LHCA.   
The hypothetical EOD UGV was a rugged treaded vehicle with an arm and 
gripper used for manipulation of an explosive device.  The analysis of this UGV allowed 
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consideration of how a system with multiple phases of operation, transit and 
manipulation, could be controlled during each phase.  This analysis also enabled study of 
each LHCA when precise and smooth detailed motion was required, as with the explosive 
device manipulation phase of operation.  
4. Methodology for Evaluation of Framework as a Theory 
The methodology described in this chapter provides a basis for evaluation of the 
LHCA conceptual framework.  The framework was evaluated per the criteria applied by 
de Winter to asses Fitt’s list.  Those criteria were plausibility, explanatory adequacy, 
interpretability, simplicity, descriptive adequacy, and generalizability (de Winter & 
Dodou, 2014).  As part of the process do determine the framework’s explanatory and 
descriptive adequacy, traits about the control of a system which can be determined based 
on the LCHA were discussed.   
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V.  Analysis and Results 
1. Chapter Overview 
The methodology for analyzing the LHCA conceptual framework used in this 
research was proposed in the previous chapter, this chapter describes the analysis.  The 
analysis served to draw useful conclusions and generalizations about systems which are 
operated at each LHCA and to show that the LHCA framework has met its two goals.  As 
described in the Chapter 3 the two goals of the LHCA framework are: 1) to develop a 
vocabulary from which to describe, discuss, understand, and contrast different systems of 
control and 2) to make predictions about the human performance effects of a control 
system during the design phase.  In addition to meeting the goals of the framework, it will 
be evaluated in a fashion similar to de Winter’s evaluation of Fitts list and compared to 
the recommendations of the DSB (de Winter & Dodou, 2014; Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology Logistics, 2012).   
2. Analysis of Real World Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework 
By categorizing systems from different domains within the LHCA framework the 
breadth of applicability of the framework is demonstrated.  Each system analyzed in this 
section includes a system description sufficient to describe the control systems which 
influence LHCA as well as each configuration of the system categorized within the 
LHCA framework.  The systems chosen for this analysis are listed in Table 3.  Finally, 
several systems include an accident description and analysis which relates to the LHCA 
the system was operated at during the accident.   
 
45 
During this analysis, the LHCA Decision Tree presented in Chapter 3 will be used 
to determine the LHCA for each configuration of the systems.   
 
2017 Volvo XC90 LHCA analysis 
The first system to be analyzed is the 2017 Volvo XC90.  This automobile has 
several subsystems that relate to vehicle control including power steering, power brakes, 
automatic traction control, anti-lock brakes, cruise control, adaptive cruise control, lane 
keeping aid, park assist pilot, and pilot assist.  A brief discussion of each of these sub 
systems and the functionality they provide will add clarity to the analysis.   
• Both power steering and power brakes are hydraulic systems which add mechanical 
assistance to the operator’s manipulation of the tire steering angle and brake pads.  
The systems are active any time the vehicle’s engine is on.  The operator uses 
continuous control inputs on the steering wheel and brake pedal.  The power steering 
hydraulic system substantially boosts the force applied to the car’s steering arm which 
in turn sets the tire steering angle.  The power brake hydraulic system boosts the force 
applied to the brake pad which pushes against the brake rotor to apply braking force 
to the tires.  Importantly, neither of these systems are making determinations about 
what the steering angle should be or how much braking force should be applied.  The 
operator is making the determinations regarding how the vehicle should be controlled, 
and simply receives a mechanical assist.  This concept is similar to a lever and a 
fulcrum for lifting an object, the lever operator sets the position of the lever and is 
receiving a mechanical assist to move the object.   
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• Automatic traction control functions by sensing if the tire is slipping against the road 
surface and reducing the force applied to the wheel if slipping is detected.  This 
system is interpreting the operator’s throttle inputs and making determinations about 
the appropriate force to apply to the wheels for maximum performance.   
• Anti-lock brakes function similar to the automatic traction control system, but with 
braking force instead of engine produced force.  The anti-lock brake system senses if 
the tire is slipping against the road surface.  If slippage, or skidding, is detected the 
anti-lock brake system cycles the brake pad force applied to the brake rotor on and 
off.  This cycling prevents loss of vehicle control by preventing a sustained skid 
during emergency braking conditions (American Automobile Association Foundation 
for Traffic Safety, 2017).   
• Cruise control functions as a simple regulator.  When the operator activates the cruise 
control system the vehicle makes throttle decisions to maintain the current speed.    
• Adaptive cruise control is similar to legacy cruise control but regulates a second 
parameter based upon information sensed from the environment. Once the operator 
has activated the adaptive cruise control system, the system will use the throttle and 
brake to regulate distance between the XC90 and the vehicle in front of the XC90.  If 
there is not a vehicle in front of the automobile the system will function like the 
legacy cruise control system. 
• Lane keeping aid is activated any time the vehicle is traveling above 45 miles per 
hour (mph) unless specifically deactivated by the operator.  This system uses optical 
sensors to determine the vehicle’s position between lane marker lines.  If the system 
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senses that the vehicle is too close to the lane’s edge, a small torque is applied to the 
steering wheel, centering the vehicle in the lane.  An additional vibration indicator 
within the steering wheel is activated if the lane keeping aid intervenes to provide 
tactile feedback to the user.  This system is temporarily deactivated if the operator 
uses the turn signals to indicate an intentional lane change.   
• When activated by the operator, the park assist aid system applies optical sensors to 
search for a parking spot (either parallel or perpendicular) as the operator drives 
forward slowly.  When a potential spot is detected the system will inform the operator 
and the operator can choose to have the system park the vehicle.  The operator will 
then put the vehicle in reverse and give brake pedal control inputs as the system 
controls the steering wheel and gives braking instructions to the operator while the 
vehicle is parked.   
• Pilot assist will control all aspects of the vehicle’s travel when activated.  The vehicle 
will control the steering wheel, brake, and throttle while the operator monitors.  For 
legal and liability reasons the operator is instructed to stay attentive and keep a hand 
on the wheel, but unless the operator overrides the system all steering, brake, and 
throttle control inputs are provided by the pilot assist system.   
• The automatic traction control, anti-lock brakes, and lane keeping aid systems are 
normally not activated consciously by the operator.  There is a switch to disable these 
systems, but these systems are actively monitoring driving conditions to intervene 
when required under normal operational procedures.  From a LHCA perspective, 
these systems will not affect the LHCA while monitoring, only when augmenting the 
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operator’s control inputs.  For example, during a skid, when the anti-lock braking 
system activates.   
As shown in Table 3 this vehicle can be operated at LHCA 1, 2, or 3.  The LHCA 
is determined by the operator activating or deactivating the subsystems described above.   
First, consider a configuration where the following systems are activated: power 
steering, power brake, automatic traction control, anti-lock brakes and cruise control.  
The first question of the decision tree is “Is the operator giving any continuous control 
inputs?” the answer to this question is yes, continuous control, because the operator is 
providing continuous control inputs for the steering wheel and the brake.  The second 
question is “Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo 
position/motor power with a control input?” the answer to this is yes, the operator is 
determining the exact steering angle of the front wheels.  Therefore, even though the 
operator has delegated direct control of the throttle control and brake control to the cruise 
control, anti-lock brakes, and traction control systems, the operator is still operating the 
vehicle at LHCA 1, direct control.   
Next consider a configuration where the adaptive cruise control is activated.  
Again, the operator has released direct control of some aspects of control but not others.  
The adaptive cruise control system does not affect the steering angle of the tires.  The 
operator is still controlling the vehicle at LHCA 1. 
If the operator were to activate the park assist aid system, then the operator only 
provides control inputs with the brake pedal.  In this case, under normal circumstances, 
the answer to both the first and second questions in the decision tree are yes and the 
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LHCA is still 1, Direct Control.  However, if ice were to cause the car to skid during the 
parking maneuver and the anti-lock brakes were to activate, then the operator would be 
controlling the vehicle at LHCA 2.  The LHCA changes because the only aspect of 
control the operator has been tasked with is now being augmented by the anti-lock brake 
system.   
If the operator chooses to activate both the adaptive cruise control and the lane 
assist aid then the operator is potentially releasing direct control of all three aspects of 
control: the throttle, the brake, and the steering angle of the tires.  For this scenario 
assume that the operator keeps a hand on the steering wheel as required by the 
manufacturer, but does not provide control inputs.  The operator is only attentively 
monitoring the vehicle for safety.  Using the decision tree to determine the LHCA the 
answer to the first question is no, the operator is using discrete control inputs.  In this 
case the second question is “Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and 
obstacle avoidance?”  The answer to this question is yes, the operator is using the 
parameters of vehicle speed, distance between vehicles, and distance from the vehicle to 
the lane markers to control the vehicle.  If a deer were to wonder onto the road the 
vehicle would not be capable of avoiding the obstacle.  Additionally, if a sharp corner 
were in the road the vehicle would not be able to appropriately slow down for a safe 
turning maneuver.  Therefore, the LHCA is Level 3, Parametric Control.   
Finally, if the operator were to activate the pilot assist system and release the 
steering wheel then the vehicle is being operated in virtually the same way as if the active 
cruise control and lane assist subsystems were simultaneously activated as described 
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above.  The answers to the decision tree questions would be discrete control and yes, the 
LHCA is Level 3, Parametric Control.   
The 2017 Volvo XC90 cannot be controlled at LHCA 4 or 5.  The system cannot 
be operated at LHCA 4 because the operator cannot input a goal for the vehicle to 
achieve and then remain uninvolved with vehicle control until that goal is achieved.  If, 
for example, the park assist system did not require operator brake inputs, when activated, 
the vehicle would be controlled at LHCA 4.  The vehicle cannot be operated at LHCA 5 
because the operator cannot input the mission and then disengage from vehicle control.  
If the operator could, from a stop, command the vehicle to drive to the nearest grocery 
store, then LHCA 5 would be possible.   
Categorizing the 2017 Volvo XC90 in all of its different configurations with 
activated and deactivated relevant subsystems illustrates the versatility of the LHCA 
framework within the automotive domain.  Additionally, addressing which LHCA are not 
attainable and why helps to show how similar systems could be analyzed under the 
LHCA conceptual framework.   
 
1940 North American Aviation P-51 Mustang LHCA analysis 
The operator controls this aircraft in flight by manipulating a control stick, rudder 
pedals, and a throttle lever.  The control systems are simple, using pullies and cables to 
translate the operator’s manipulations of the control input devices directly into physical 
motions of the ailerons, elevator, rudder, and the air intake throttle valve.   
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The answer to the first question in the LHCA Decision Tree, “Is the operator 
giving any continuous control inputs?” is yes, continuous control inputs.  The operator 
provides continuous control inputs for the control stick and the rudder pedals.  The 
answer to the second question “Is the operator deciding the exact position of any control 
surfaces/servo position/motor power with a control input?” is also yes.  The operator has 
direct control over all aspects of the control surfaces and engine settings.  The P-51 is a 
classic example of LHCA 1, Direct Control, illustrating how a simple system can be 
controlled directly by the operator.   
 
1989, Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit 
The control systems of this aircraft are interesting because of the contrast to the 
simplicity of the P-51’s control systems.  Whereas the P-51 is solely controlled by the 
position of the operator’s control input devices, the B-2 has a complex fly-by-wire system 
which interprets the position of the control devices as well as environmental data to 
determine the proper flight settings.  Specifically, there are 24 pitot-static sensors 
mounted flush with the skin of the aircraft which are used to calculate air speed, altitude, 
angle of attack, as well as other flight data.  When the operator pulls back on the control 
stick the flight computer combines that input with information from the pitot-static 
sensors to set the control surfaces in a configuration which will pitch the aircraft’s nose 
up.  This is very different than the P-51 control system which will directly move the 
elevators as the operator pulls the control stick back.   
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This aircraft has two applicable flight modes which were analyzed within the 
LHCA conceptual framework.  The first was with the autopilot disengaged and the 
second was with the autopilot engaged, maintaining specific flight parameters.   
With the aircraft in the first configuration, autopilot disengaged, the answer to the 
first decision tree question, “is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?” is yes, 
continuous control inputs are being used.  The answer to the second question “Is the 
operator deciding the exact position of any control surfaces/servo positions/motor power 
with a control input?” is no, the fight computer is determining those positions and 
settings.  Therefore, the LHCA is 2, Augmented Control.   
The fly-by wire system is used because of the complexity of controlling the flight 
of the B-2, caused by its inherent flight instability.  Constant adjustments would need to 
be made across many control settings to control this aircraft and these control settings 
would place extreme workload on the pilot, assuming the pilot was capable of performing 
these control settings in a timely fashion.  Therefore, the fly-by-wire system in this 
aircraft greatly reduces the pilot workload and enables this aircraft to be effectively 
controlled.   
With the aircraft in the second configuration, autopilot engaged, the answer to the 
first decision tree question, “is the operator giving any continuous control inputs?” is no, 
exclusively discrete control inputs are being used.  The answer to the second question “is 
the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance?” is yes, the 
aircraft is not detecting and taking steps to avoid either stationary or moving obstacles, it 
is simply maintaining flight parameters.  Therefore, the LHCA is 3, Parametric Control.   
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On 23 February, 2008 a B-2 at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, crashed 17 
seconds after takeoff because of a failure in the sensors which feed data to the flight 
control system.  Per the official accident report moisture contaminated three of the 24 
surface mounted pitot-static sensors.  These sensors indicated to the flight computer that 
the aircraft needed to pitch the aircraft nose up.  In response, the flight computer 
commanded the control surfaces to put the aircraft into a steep climb.  The operator 
pushed forward on the control stick in an attempt to overcome the pitch up, but this 
control input was not passed to the control surfaces as the operator intended because of 
the corrupted pitot-static data.  The aircraft’s high angle of attack caused the aircraft to 
stall, the operators ejected, and the aircraft was lost (USAF, 2008).  This accident was the 
most expensive Class A accident in USAF history.  This mishap is an example of how, by 
allocating control decisions to automation, brittleness and potential faults are added to the 
system.   
 
1976, General Dynamics F-16 Falcon. 
The F-16 is equipped with three systems that are relevant to LHCA analysis.  A 
fly-by-wire flight control system, an autopilot, and the Automatic Ground Collision 
Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS).   
From a LHCA perspective, the fly-by-wire control system functions similar to the 
B-2’s flight control system.  By applying pressure to the control stick and rudders the 
operator commands a pitch, roll, or yaw rate, not specific control surface positions.  
Somewhat uniquely, the F-16 control stick is in a fixed position, a force meter senses the 
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operator’s applied force to receive role and pitch control inputs.  After initial testing, 
slight movement was added for pilot feedback but much less than a traditional control 
stick.  The control surface positions are determined by the flight computer based on 
environmental data combined with pilot control inputs.   
The autopilot system functions as a regulator, maintaining flight parameters 
entered by the operator.  Pitot-static, GPS, and inertial navigation sensors on the aircraft 
feed flight and navigational data to the flight computer which adjusts the control surfaces 
and thrust to meet the operator’s commanded flight parameters.   
The Auto-GCAS is intended to prevent controlled flight into ground accidents.  
This system is designed to prevent mishaps caused by operator’s loss of SA, spatial 
disorientation, loss of consciousness from over-G, and gear-up landings.  The aircraft 
uses navigational and flight data combined with a global terrain map to determine if a 
collision with the ground is imminent.  If the aircraft senses that a ground collision is 
imminent, audio and visual warnings are given to the operator.  If the operator does not 
act to prevent the collision the Auto-GCAS will right the aircraft (wings level) and fly 
level on the aircraft’s last course.  Auto-GCAS will relinquish control to the operator 
when the operator begins making control inputs after the recovery.  The operator has the 
option to override Auto-GCAS recovery, but if no action is taken the Auto-GCAS will 
recover the aircraft without any input from the operator.   
To analyze the F-16 within the LHCA conceptual framework three flight 
configurations needed to be categorized: autopilot disengaged, autopilot engaged, and 
Auto-GCAS active.  A discussion of the responsibilities of the operator and Auto-GCAS 
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serves to illustrate how the LHCA conceptual framework can be applied in unique 
control situations.   
First consider the configuration where the F-16 is being operated with the 
autopilot system disabled and the operator using the control stick, rudder pedals, and 
thrust lever to control the aircraft.  The operator is giving continuous control inputs, but 
not commanding specific control surface positions, following the LHCA Decision Tree 
the LHCA is 2, Augmented Control.   
The second configuration considered was the operator controlling the aircraft with 
the autopilot engaged.  The operator does not provide continuous control inputs but 
remains responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle avoidance tasks.  Therefore, the 
LHCA is 3, Parametric Control.   
The final configuration to consider is a scenario where the Auto-GCAS has 
sensed an imminent ground collision and has begun aircraft recovery.  At first glance, this 
configuration may seem to not be able to be categorized because the operator is not 
providing any control inputs.  However, the operator is using predetermined control 
inputs, parameters determining the safe recovery altitude and cursing airspeed are 
determined within the flight manual.  Additionally, the aircraft’s post-recovery heading is 
the heading before the Auto-GCAS was enabled.  Therefore, the answer to the first 
LHCA Decision Tree question is “exclusively discrete control” because these control 
inputs are discrete not continuous.   
The next question in the LHCA Decision Tree may also seem to cause an issue 
for the LHCA framework.  “Is the operator responsible for safety monitoring and obstacle 
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avoidance?”  This may cause confusion because the operator could be unconscious when 
the Auto-GCAS is engaged, and yet the Auto-GCAS is not able to detect and avoid mid-
air collisions with other aircraft.  This begs the question, is the operator responsible for 
avoiding other aircraft while unconscious?  In this case, yes, as the Auto-GCAS is simply 
meeting and maintaining flight parameters until further notice and not actively avoiding 
mid-air collisions.  Responsibility for avoiding all obstacles that are not in the aircraft’s 
onboard terrain map, which the Auto-GCAS depends on, falls on the operator.  The gap 
between the Auto-GCAS capability to detect and avoid mid-air collisions, and the 
operator’s capability to avoid them because of potential unconsciousness is a risk.  The 
LHCA is 3, Parametric Control with a risk of mid-air collisions accepted by aircraft 
designers and operators.   
 
1974, Airbus A300-600R.  
The flight control systems of the Airbus A300-600R are similar to the B-2 and F-
16 aircraft because it has fly-by-wire and autopilot systems.  The two different flight 
configurations, autopilot enabled and autopilot disabled, are operated at LHCA 2 and 3 
respectively.  To categorize these two configurations one would apply the same logic that 
was used to categorize the flight configurations as the B-2 and F-16.   
On 26 April 1994, an Airbus A300-600R crashed at Nagoya airport in Japan 
because of operator confusion about the current LHCA.  The aircraft’s autopilot was 
engaged in takeoff/go-around (TO/GA) mode by the first officer.  When the pilot took 
control and attempted to land the aircraft manually the aircraft entered an unrecoverable 
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stall at low altitude (Beringer & Harris, 1999).  As the aircraft did a low pass over the 
runway (go-around) the pilot pushed forward on the yolk and reduced throttle in an 
attempt to land the aircraft.  However, because the autopilot was engaged in the TO/GA 
mode the autopilot counteracted the pilot’s control inputs using the aircraft’s trim control 
surfaces which the autopilot maintained control of.  The reduced throttle input given by 
the operator and the autopilot’s trim input caused the aircraft to pitch up sharply, then 
stall and crash.  Two hundred sixty four of 271 people onboard were killed in the 
accident (Ministry of Transportation, 1996).  
This case is an example of an operator providing control inputs at LHCA 2 while 
the aircraft was in a mode where it could effectively receive control inputs only at LHCA 
3.  This accident highlights the need for clear communication of LHCA expectations 
between the pilot and aircraft.   
 
2006, HRP, manufactured by Kawada Industries, modified by CMU   
This bipedal robot was initially developed by Kawada industries and then 
modified by CMU to operate at LHCA 2, Augmented Control.  The CMU HRP is 
controlled in real time with a joystick by a single operator.  The operator moves the 
joystick in a direction and the HRP responds by taking steps in that direction.  The 
operator remains responsible for determining the path of the robot to avoid obstacles.  If 
the operator relaxes the joystick to the rest position the robot will stop and maintain 
balance (Chestnutt et al., 2006).   
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Balance is a constant challenge for the HRP because of its bipedal nature.  Much 
like a human, standing still requires micro adjustments to maintain balance.  As the robot 
picks up one of its two feet and moves it forward, the robot must ensure that it’s center of 
gravity (CoG) remains positioned under the other foot to prevent a fall.  The CMU HPR 
control scheme allows a non-technical operator to control this very complex machine by 
removing the operator from the balance control loop.  The operator simply guides the 
robot in the desired direction using the joystick.   
 
2016, DJI Phantom 4   
This multi-rotor consumer UAS is equipped with many sub-systems which allow 
it to be operated at LHCA 2, 3, 4, or 5.  Below, each flight configuration is described and 
categorized within the LHCA conceptual framework.   
The default flight mode for the Phantom 4 is a fly-by-wire system where the 
operator uses joysticks to provide control inputs to the UAV.  By manipulating the 
control sticks the operator is commanding pitch, role, yaw, and power settings.  The 
operator’s commands are achieved by adjusting relative power, and therefore lift, of the 
rotors to maneuver the UAV.  Following the LHCA Decision Tree will show that in its 
default mode the UAV is controlled at LHCA 2.   
The Phantom 4 can also be controlled by commanding flight parameters and 
waypoints.  The operator can set waypoints using an interactive map as well as airspeed 
and altitude settings.  When commanded, the UAV will fly on a course directly toward 
the waypoint at the specified altitude and airspeed, not avoiding any obstacles.  Under 
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these conditions the UAV is being operated at LHCA 3 Parametric Control, because the 
operator maintains responsibility for obstacle avoidance and the UAV is simply 
following specified parameters.  (DJI, 2016) 
The UAV has a relevant flight mode called “ActiveTrack.”  When this flight 
mode is activated, the UAV will track a target with the onboard camera.  As the target 
moves, the camera and UAV itself will move to keep the target centered in the camera’s 
field of view.  The UAV has obstacle avoidance sensors which will help the UAV avoid 
both stationary and moving obstacles while tracking the target.  Under these conditions 
the operator is controlling the UAV at LHCA 4 because the operator is not providing 
continuous control inputs and is not responsible for flight safety, but has not commanded 
an entire mission to be completed, just a goal.  (DJI, 2016) 
The Phantom 4 has several other flight modes which allow it to be operated at 
LHCA 4.  A mode called “TapFly” allows the operator to tap a location on the camera’s 
video feed, the UAV will fly to that location avoiding obstacles on the way.  When the 
“Return To Home” mode is activated the UAV will fly to a predetermined location if the 
radio connection is lost, plotting its own course and avoiding obstacles (DJI, 2016).   
Finally, this UAV can be controlled at LHCA 5 using a 3D mapping function.  To 
use this function, an operator selects the 3D mapping mode, specifies the area to be 
mapped, and then commands the UAV to execute the orders.  The operator may adjust 
settings such as the number of photos to be taken per linear foot and the flight altitude 
which both relate to the resolution of the final 3D image.  When commanded, the UAV 
will take off, fly to the area to be mapped, overfly and take aerial photography of the 
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specified area on a course which the system has determined, and finally return to and land 
at the takeoff location.  In addition, during its flight the UAV will avoid obstacles.  This 
is considered LHCA 5 instead of LHCA 4 because the operator does not provide 
intermittent commands between the beginning and end of the mission.  Therefore, the 
UAV executes the mission completely autonomously.   
This type of telerobotic control, with many operational modes at different LHCA, 
enables the operator to control the vehicle at the desired level of detail.  The UAV can be 
controlled with a low level of detail when the operator does not want to allocate much 
attention to control of the UAV.  For example, if the operator wanted to record 
themselves performing a recreational activity they would use a mode which enabled 
LHCA 4.  In contrast the operator may need to perform a task which requires a high level 
of detail of control such as slaloming between obstacles, in this case an operator would 
use the default flight mode and control the UAV at LHCA 2.  The versatility of control 
options, enabling many LHCA, increases the operational flexibility of this UAV.   
 
2016, PRENAV Drone System 
The PRENAV UAS is a system which is designed to inspect hard to reach 
locations such as cellular and radio transmission towers or windmills.  This system is 
specifically designed to be operated at LHCA 5, allowing laymen to operate the system.  
To control the UAS, the operator indicates what the inspection target is.  Next the UAS 
plots a course and when commanded flies that course, returning to its starting location 
when the inspection is complete.  This UAS replaces a previous generation of systems 
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which were controlled at LHCA 2 and required a high level of operator training to 
operate  (McSweeney, 2016). 
While this UAS is interesting in itself, the primary point of interest here is that 
LHCA was a design requirement.  It was important that a very low level of detail of 
control inputs be provided to the UAS by the operator.  This requirement enables lower 
labor costs and more flexible operations for the users.  As more automation is 
incorporated into systems, it is possible that LHCA may be a driving design requirement 
for many systems of the future.   
Overall, the results of the analysis of existing real world systems illustrates a total 
of 16 system states from nine different systems within 3 different industries were 
successfully categorized into one of the five LHCAs.  This evaluation was complete by 
answering the small set of questions shown in the decision tree shown in Figure 5. 
 
3. Analysis of Hypothetical Systems within the LHCA Conceptual Framework 
The presentation of hypothetical systems which can be configured to operate at 
each LHCA helps to show trends in the effect of LHCA on system operations and more 
clearly differentiates between each level.  Three systems, a fixed wing UAV, a bipedal 
UGV, and a treaded EOD UGV with a manipulator arm and gripper, were chosen for this 
analysis.  These hypothetical systems were chosen because they each operate in very 
different domains, all of which are of interest to the DoD, and illustrate how these types 
of systems could be operated at each LHCA.   
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Fixed Wing UAV 
The fixed wing UAV is the first hypothetical system to be analyzed within the 
LHCA conceptual framework.  Below, Table 5 describes each of the five configurations 
of the hypothetical system.  The LHCA, the operator’s control inputs, the relevant aspects 
of the control system, and an explanation of the LHCA are given for each configuration.   
 
Table 5 – Hypothetical Fixed Wing UAV configurations 
LHCA Operator Control Inputs 
Control System 
Description LHCA explanation 
1, Direct 
Control 
The operator uses 
control sticks to control 
the UAV.  Two joysticks 
control elevator, aileron, 
rudder, and motor 
power. 
Signals received from 
the operator indicate 
servo positions and 
motor power directly.   
The operator is 
deciding exact servo 
positions and motor 
power. 
2, Augmented 
Control 
The operator uses 
control sticks to control 
the UAV.  Two  
joysticks control pitch, 
yaw, role, and thrust. 
Signals received from 
the operator are 
processed by a 
stability control 
system which sets 
servo positions and 
motor power. 
The operator is 
deciding what flight 
maneuvers to perform, 
but the stability 
controller is deciding 
exact control surface 
positions. 
3, Parametric 
Control 
The operator enters 
desired altitude, 
airspeed, and heading 
into a control panel. 
Signals received from 
the operator, onboard 
navigation and flight 
data sensors are used 
to fly aircraft as 
desired. 
The operator enters 
desired flight 
parameters, the system 
works to achieve those 
parameters.  The 
operator remains 
responsible for safety. 
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4, Goal Oriented 
Control 
The operator selects the 
pre-programed goal to 
return  home while 
avoiding obstacles. 
A signal to return 
home is received by 
the UAV.  The UAV 
uses navigation tools, 
optical sensors, and 
stability control to fly 
'home.' Obstacles are 
detected and avoided. 
The operator enters a 
desired goal, the system 
determines the required 
actions to achieve the 
goal and then executes 
these actions. 
5, Mission 
Capable Control 
The operator selects a 
mission from pre-
programed options, 
enters specific mission 
parameters, and 
commands mission 
execution. 
The UAV receives the 
mission parameters 
from the ground 
station, navigates to 
the operational area, 
achieves mission 
goal(s), and navigates 
to and lands at 'home.' 
The operator enters the 
mission, the system 
determines how to 
achieve the mission and 
requires no further 
input from the operator 
after the execution 
order. 
 
The Direct Control, LHCA 1, configuration is controlled by the operator using 
two joysticks, each joystick axis controls a control surface or the motor power.  In this 
configuration, the operator is controlling the exact settings for all aspects of control using 
continuous control inputs, as is expected for a system controlled at LHCA 1. 
The Augmented Control, LHCA 2, configuration is also controlled with two 
joysticks; however, each joystick axis controls either the thrust or the role, pitch, or yaw 
rate.  This contrasts the Direct Control configuration because the position of the control 
surface is not controlled by the operator, but an algorithm which considers the joystick 
positions as one of its inputs.   
The Parametric Control, LHCA 3, configuration functions just like the autopilot 
systems described in the real-world system section.  The operator sets flight parameters 
and the UAV adjusts the control surfaces and motor power to achieve those parameters.  
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This indirect method of control using discrete control inputs which keeps obstacle 
avoidance responsibilities with the operator is indicative of LHCA 3.   
The Goal Oriented Control, LCHA 4, configuration allows the operator to enter 
one of many pre-programed goals to be accomplished mid-mission.  The example ‘return 
to home’ is given in the Table 5 description, but any mid-mission goal would qualify for 
LHCA 4.  The operator commands the UAV to fly to a pre-determined location 
designated ‘home’ and land there.  Note that the command initiating this action may be a 
loss of radio signal.  The UAV then navigates ‘home’, accepting flight safety 
responsibilities along the way.  This configuration enables the level of human attention 
required to drop dramatically.  The operator may be fully engaged in another activity and 
just receive notice when the goal is accomplished, or if some issue arises.   
The Mission Capable Control, LHCA 5, configuration is controlled by the 
operator before takeoff.  The operator gives commands for the UAV to execute a mission, 
specifying required parameters, the UAV then executes the mission without further 
control inputs from the operator.  Similar to LHCA 4, in this configuration the operator’s 
required attention is dramatically reduced.   
To further illustrate the differences between each LHCA a series of functional 
decomposition diagrams were developed.  The series of functional decompositions was 
chosen to be included in the hypothetical UAV instead of other systems because this 
system could be operated at each LHCA, allowing a graphical illustration of each LHCA.  
This same exercise could be completed for any system, but the functional decomposition 
would have different components.  Obviously, an automobile would have a different set 
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of decomposed functions than a UAV, but the automobile’s functions could also be 
allocated to either the operator or the system at each LHCA.  
The functions associated with the flight operations of the UAV were decomposed 
and then allocated to either the system or the operator.  The components of the UAV’s 
Flight Operations were: Flight Control and Dynamic Mission Planning.  These 
components were decomposed further and then allocated to the entity responsible for the 
leaf level function.  Precise definitions of each leaf level function were described in bullet 
format below: 
• Determine Flight Parameters – Setting the aircraft’s air speed, altitude, heading, rate 
of climb/decent, or similar aspects of controlling the UAS 
• Determine Pitch/Roll/Yaw/Thrust – Continuously choosing the desired pitch, roll, 
yaw, or thrust required to achieve the desired flight parameters. 
• Determine Control Surface & Motor Power - Continuously choosing the desired 
elevator, aileron, rudder, and motor power required to achieve the desired pitch, roll, 
yaw, or throttle setting.   
• Determine Intermediate Goals – Determine the next goal to be achieved during a 
mission.   
• Determine Flight Path – Determine the desired course of the aircraft to achieve the 
intermediate goal. 
Determine Obstacle Avoidance Route – Determine how the aircraft should divert 
from the desired flight path to avoid obstacles.  
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The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for 
LHCA 1 is shown in Figure 8.  When the UAV is controlled at LHCA 1 all control duties 
are allocated to the operator.   
•  
 
Figure 8– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 1 
The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for 
LHCA 2 is shown in Figure 9.  When controlled at LHCA 2, the operator is commanding 
pitch, roll, yaw, and thrust.  The system uses these inputs as well as flight data to 
determine the control surface and motor power. 
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Figure 9– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 2 
The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for 
LHCA 3 is shown in Figure 10.  When controlled at LHCA 3, the operator is 
commanding flight parameters such as airspeed, altitude, and heading.  The system uses 
these inputs as well as flight data to determine the pitch, roll, yaw, and thrust required to 
meet those parameters, then manipulates the control surfaces and sets motor power as 
required.   
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Figure 10– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 3 
 The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for 
LHCA 4 is shown in Figure 11.  When controlled at LHCA 4, the operator is 
commanding intermediate goals for the system to achieve.  The system must process the 
assigned goal and work to achieve it without further control inputs from the operator until 
the intermediate goal is achieved.  Therefore, the system must determine its own flight 
path and avoid obstacles while maneuvering to achieve the goal.  In addition, the more 
detailed flight decisions are allocated to the system as was the case for LHCA 2.     
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Figure 11– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 4 
The Hypothetical UAV functional decomposition of control related duties for 
LHCA 5 is shown in Figure 12.  When controlled at LHCA 4, the operator commands a 
full mission to be completed and the system must execute autonomously.  To enable this 
LHCA the system is responsible for setting and achieving intermediate goals on the path 
to accomplishing the overall mission.   
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Figure 12– Hypothetical UAV Functional Decomposition of Control Duties, LHCA 5 
Bipedal UGV 
The next system to be considered is a hypothetical bipedal UGV which can be 
configured to be controlled at each LHCA.  The intent of this analysis is to illustrate that 
complex systems are very difficult to control at LHCA 1 and to show how a system in 
this domain could be operated at each LHCA.  Table 6 describes each of the five 
configurations of the hypothetical system.  The overall system description is included in 
Chapter 4. 
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Table 6– Hypothetical Bipedal UGV LHCA configurations 
LHCA Operator Inputs Control System Description LHCA explanation 
1, Direct 
Control 
The operator must 
specify the position 
of every joint 
continuously.   
An operator sets the 
position/angle of each 
joint continuously and 
maintains UGV balance. 
The operator is responsible 
for setting the joint 
positions for the UGV.  The 
operator must provide 
continuous input for all 
joints and maintain balance 
of the system as it 
maneuvers.   
2, 
Augmented 
Control 
The operator uses a 
control stick to 
command direction 
and speed of travel. 
Signals received from the 
operator are processed by 
a stability control system 
which controls the joint 
positions. 
The operator decides where 
the UGV should travel and 
provides continuous control 
inputs, but the stability 
controller is deciding exact 
servo positions. 
3, 
Parametric 
Control 
The operator enters 
desired waypoints, 
the operator is 
responsible for 
determining the 
exact walking path 
of the UGV. 
In combination with 
onboard navigational 
sensors, parameters and 
waypoints are received 
from the operator and are 
used to guide the UGV 
through the desired path. 
The operator enters the 
desired path of travel, the 
system determines the 
actions to take to travel 
along that path. 
4, Goal 
Oriented 
Control 
The operator selects 
a desired pre-
programed goal to 
pick up a box at 
waypoint A and 
place it at waypoint 
B, the UGV 
determines the path 
between points A 
and B. 
The UGV receives the 
operator’s command and 
then travels to point A, 
detects the box, picks up 
the box, travels to point B, 
and puts the box down.  
Then stands by for 
additional instructions 
from operator. 
The operator enters a 
desired goal, the system 
determines what actions are 
required to achieve that 
goal and then works to 
achieve that goal. 
5, Mission 
Capable 
Control 
The operator selects 
mission parameters 
from pre-programed 
options, enters 
specific mission 
parameters, and 
commands mission 
execution. 
The UGV receives the 
operator’s command and 
then executes the entire 
mission without additional 
input from the operator 
after execution begins. 
The operator enters an 
entire mission, the system 
determines exactly how to 
achieve that mission and 
requires no further input 
from the operator after the 
execution order. 
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The primary point of interest with this system is that real time control of this 
system would be virtually impossible at LHCA 1.  An operator would be required to 
control balance related micro adjustments manually without the aid of an active stabilizer 
system.  This would likely exceed what an operator could realistically handle for even a 
simple task like walking, let alone any operational use of the UGV.  The issues related to 
controlling this hypothetical bipedal humanoid robot at LHCA 1 are similar to issues 
related to controlling the B-2 as described earlier in this chapter.  An operator requires the 
assistance of active stabilization to effectively control a complex, unstable system. 
By contrast this hypothetical system could be operated at LHCA 2.  This control 
scheme could function the same as the CMU HRP described earlier in this chapter.  The 
operator would provide guidance through a joystick on the desired direction and speed of 
travel.  In response to these control inputs controlling algorithms would activate the 
actual servos controlling joint positions and move the UGV as commanded by the 
operator. 
When configured for Parametric Control the operator would set waypoints and 
speed parameters for the UGV.  The stability algorithms would still be used to maintain 
balance and walk, but the input to those algorithms would be from the navigation 
computer, not the operator’s joystick as in Augmented Control.  In this configuration, the 
UGV is not aware of obstacles, the operator is still responsible for obstacle avoidance.  If 
the operator were to set a waypoint on the far side of a hazard, the UGV would travel 
directly toward the waypoint and trip on the obstacle.  The operator must use waypoints 
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to instruct the UGV on a safe path to follow during operations.  Figure 13 below 
illustrates how the operator would need to use the waypoints to guide the UGV around 
any obsticles.   
 
Figure 13 – Parametric Control Obstacle Avoidance 
 
The Goal Oriented Control configuration allows the operator to command a goal.  
The UGV is capable of achieving that goal without additional instructions from the 
operator.  The example given in the Table 6 is a command to move a box from point A to 
point B.  This example is depicted in Figure 14.  The operator commands the goal, then 
the UGV executes the goal without further instruction from the operator, even if obstacles 
are in the direct path.  This scenario assumes that the mission for the UGV was more 
involved than moving the box from point A to point B.  If moving the box were the entire 
mission, this would be an example of Mission Capable Control.   
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Figure 14 – Goal Oriented Control Example 
If the UGV is configured for Mission Capable Control, the operator will be able 
to command the entire mission to the UGV.  The UGV would be instructed on what must 
be done then would autonomously execute that mission without further guidance from the 
operator.  For instance, the robot might be commanded to move boxes from a stack to 
their appropriate locations within a warehouse. 
 
EOD UGV 
This hypothetical EOD UGV is designed to be able to transport itself several 
hundred yards, from a safe location where it is deployed to the location of the hazardous 
ordinance and then manipulate the ordinance with a gripper.  The two phases of operation 
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(i.e., transit and manipulation) will be considered separately for the LHCA analysis.  
During the transit phase the UGV is traveling, during the manipulation phase the UGV is 
using the manipulator arm to grip the ordinance.  Table 7 below briefly describes the 
hypothetical EOD UGV configurations.  A photo of how this UGV may look is shown in 
Figure 15 below.   
 
Table 7 – Hypothetical EOD UGV LHCA configurations 
LHCA Operator Inputs Control System Description 
LHCA 
explanation 
1, Direct 
Control - 
Transit Phase 
The operator uses 2 joysticks 
to control the treads 
independently giving the 
capability to move forward, 
backward, turn while 
traveling, or spin in place. 
Signals received from 
operator indicate tread 
rotation motor power for 
each tread directly.  The operator is 
deciding exact 
servo positions 
and motor power 
for each aspect of 
the UGV 1, Direct 
Control - 
Manipulation 
Phase 
A separate set of three 
joysticks control the robotic 
arm and gripper for 
manipulation.  Each axis of 
motion of the joysticks 
controls a separate joint on 
the UGV. 
Signals received from 
the operator indicate arm 
and gripper servo 
positions directly. 
2, 
Augmented 
Control - 
Transit Phase 
The operator uses joysticks to 
control UGV locomotion.  On 
board sensors detect 
overbalancing and prevent 
UGV actions that would 
cause a roll-over.  
Additionally, a stabilization 
system on the arm 
instantaneously and 
automatically counteracts 
unintentional bouncing 
motion in the arm during 
transit. 
Signals received from 
the operator are 
processed by the 
stability control system 
which then passes 
signals along to control 
tread motors and arm 
servo position. 
The operator is 
deciding what 
actions should be 
taken, but the arm 
and locomotion 
stability control 
systems are 
deciding exact 
final control inputs 
to the motors and 
servos. 
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2, 
Augmented 
Control - 
Manipulation 
Phase 
The operator uses joysticks to 
control the arm, however 
each axis on a joystick can 
control a degree of freedom 
of motion for the UGV arm 
and gripper.  Each degree of 
freedom may affect the 
position of multiple servos 
working in combination. A 
stabilization system ensures 
smooth motion of arm and 
gripper.  Additionally, 
sensors on the gripper detect 
slippage of the explosive 
ordinance device and apply 
appropriate grip pressure to 
prevent slippage without 
applying unnecessary 
pressure to the ordinance. 
Signals received from 
the operator are 
processed by the control 
system and the auto-grip 
system which then pass 
signals along to the arm 
and gripper servos.  An 
example of a degree of 
freedom of motion is 
moving the end of the 
arm left or right, this 
may result in many 
servos working in 
combination to 
coordinate this action, 
for example the "wrist" 
of the robot arm would 
compensate for the 
sideways motion to 
maintain the orientation 
of the gripper which 
would be a different 
degree of freedom.   
The operator is 
deciding what 
actions should be 
taken, but the arm 
control and auto-
grip systems are 
deciding exact 
final control inputs 
to the motors and 
servos.   
3, Parametric 
Control - 
Transit Phase 
The operator inputs 
waypoints for the UGV to 
travel between as well as a 
speed to maintain.  The 
operator is responsible for 
maneuvering around 
obstacles. 
Signals received from 
operator in combination 
with onboard navigation 
sensors are used by the 
UGV to travel to the 
desired location. 
The operator 
enters a desired 
ground path and 
travel parameters, 
the system 
determines what 
actions should be 
taken to achieve 
those parameters. 
3, Parametric 
Control - 
Manipulation 
Phase 
The operator inputs desired 
arm and gripper positions, 
then presses an "execute" 
button.  This requires 
multiple iterations of the 
desired input then executes as 
the ordinance is inspected and 
manipulated. 
Signals received from 
the operator in 
combination with 
onboard proprioception 
(knowledge of arm and 
gripper position) allow 
the UGV to move the 
arm and gripper to the 
position desired by the 
operator. 
The operator 
enters discrete 
inputs indicating 
the desired 
position of the 
gripper and arm.  
The system 
manipulates the 
arm to achieve the 
desired position. 
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4, Goal 
Oriented 
Control - 
Transit Phase 
The operator inputs desired 
end position of UGV as well 
as any desired areas to avoid 
along the potential route, 
such as buried landmines or 
enemy occupied territory. 
The system uses 
onboard navigation data, 
environmental sensors, 
and operator's inputs to 
generate the route.  The 
UGV then travels along 
that route with no further 
input from operator.  
The UGV will avoid 
obstacles along the route 
as that is a requirement 
to achieve the goal. 
The operator 
enters a desired 
goal, the system 
determines what 
actions are 
required to 
achieve that goal, 
and finally works 
to achieve the 
goal. 4, Goal Oriented 
Control - 
Manipulation 
Phase 
The operator selects a desired 
pre-programed goal, for 
example "grab and lift 
ordinance."  
The system uses 
environmental sensors as 
well as proprioception to 
detect the ordinance, 
then grab and lift it. 
5, Mission 
Capable 
Control - 
Both Phases 
The operator selects mission 
parameters from pre-
programed options, for 
example "grab and lift 
ordinance located at Location 
X then carry it to Location Y 
and return to current 
location.”  As with LHCA 4, 
the operator is required to 
enter specific mission 
parameters, for example "stay 
out of area Z during transit."  
Then commands mission 
initialization. 
The UGV receives the 
mission parameters from 
the operator, then 
navigates to the 
ordinance, achieves 
mission goal, and 
navigates back to current 
location. 
The operator 
enters the desired 
goal of an entire 
mission, the 
system determines 
exactly how to 
achieve that 
mission and 
requires no further 
input from the 
operator after the 
execution order. 
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Figure 15 – Photograph of Hypothetical EOD UGV (“Talon EOD robot,” 2017) 
 
Transit Phase 
During the Transit Phase the Direct Control configuration of the UGV is 
controlled by the operator with a pair of joysticks, each joystick controls the power to one 
of the two treads.  The operator is able to steer the UGV with differential power applied 
to the treads.  In this configuration, the operator is responsible for all decisions regarding 
how the UGV interacts with its environment. 
The Augmented Control configuration of the UGV is controlled similarly to the 
Direct Control configuration, but with the addition of safeguard and stabilization features.  
The operator provides the same types of control inputs, but an anti-roll system guards 
against overbalancing the UGV.  An onboard sensor detects the vehicle’s CoG and the 
terrain angle.  The stability system will not pass along commands which will cause a roll.  
This system functions similar to an anti-stall or stick shaker in an aircraft, preventing 
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possible human operator errors.  In addition, the stabilization system uses inertial sensors 
and servo controls to provide micro adjustments to stabilize the arm during transit.  This 
provides an active suspension feature to stabilize the arm during transport, preventing a 
carried ordinance device from being unintentionally jostled. 
The Parametric Control configuration is controlled similar to the hypothetical 
bipedal UGV’s Parametric Control configuration.  The operator will input waypoints and 
speed, then the system will travel to those waypoints.  The operator remains responsible 
for obstacle avoidance.   
The Goal Oriented Control configuration is also controlled similar to the 
hypothetical bipedal UGV’s equivalent configuration.  The operator commands a location 
for the UGV to travel to along with any areas to avoid, then the vehicle will make its way 
to the specified location.   
There is not a transit phase and a manipulation phase for the Mission Capable 
Configuration because the UGV does not intermittently receive instructions from the 
operator.  Instead the operator provides all relevant mission data before the before the 
mission begins and the UGV autonomously accomplishes the mission.  For this reason 
the Mission Capable Configuration will not be discussed in the Manipulation Phase 
section below.   
 
Manipulation Phase 
In the Direct Control configuration, the operator controls every aspect of the 
vehicle directly.  A set of three joysticks are used, each axis of the joysticks correlates to 
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a joint on the UGV arm or gripper.  Just as with all systems, in the direct control mode no 
“computer assistance” or “active stabilization” is provided by the UGV.  Figure 16 below 
shows how the joints would be controlled.  Each set of arrows in the LHCA 1 portion of 
the figure maps to an axis of one of the control sticks.   
The Augmented Control configuration is also controlled with joysticks, but each 
joystick controls a degree of freedom of the arm and gripper instead of a single joint.  
This change means that when the operator provides a single control input the response on 
the UGV may be several servos reacting in concert.  This difference is illustrated in 
Figure 16 below.  In addition, active stabilization and auto-grip features are available.  
The active stabilization system reduces vibrations in the arm and ensures that motions are 
smooth instead of irregular.  The auto-grip feature regulates the grip pressure of the UGV 
to prevent slippage of anything in the gripper, while at the same time ensuring too much 
pressure is not applied.  These additional systems are examples of control at LHCA 2, the 
operator uses continuous control inputs to instruct the UGV how to move then a 
computer provides assistance to accomplish the operator’s intentions effectively.   
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Figure 16– Difference between LHCA 1 and 2 during manipulation phase for the 
EOD UGV 
 
If the EOD UGV is operated in the Parametric Control configuration during the 
manipulation phase, a set of challenges arise.  The operator must give commands in the 
format of parameters for the UGV to achieve.  An operator would provide a control input 
such as “move the manipulator arm down 4 inches” and the UGV would respond 
appropriately with an action.  To be clear, the control input described could be given with 
just a few key strokes or a dial, but the information passed would be the control input 
described above.  The operator would need to repeat this process until the gripper was 
closed on the device and the arm could be retracted for transit.  This process becomes 
even more challenging if the device is not in the open, but is behind some sort of 
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immovable obstacle.  In such a case the operator would need to give many detailed 
control inputs to maneuver the arm around the obstacle and then grab the device. 
The Parametric Control configuration is interesting because of the high level of 
detail the manipulation phase demands.  A classic example of LHCA 3 is an autopilot 
system where the operator enters parameters for the vehicle to maintain and then takes a 
monitoring role.  This is an effective implementation of control at LHCA 3 because the 
time required between control input is usually on the order of minutes or hours.  In the 
case of the EOD UGV during the manipulation phase a Parametric Control scheme a very 
short period of time between control inputs is required.  This issue was discussed further 
in Chapter 6.   
When the UGV is operated in the Goal Oriented Control configuration the 
operator provides a single command to grab the ordinance and lift it, this may be done 
with a few button presses on a touch screen video feed.  With this single command the 
UGV will move the arm and gripper to grasp and lift the ordinance.   
As discussed in the Transit Phase section, LHCA 5 cannot be decomposed into 
two phases.  Therefore, it will not be further discussed in the Manipulation phase. 
In summary, the analysis of hypothetical systems included the development of a 
system configuration corresponding to each LHCA.  Each configuration was then 
analyzed within the LHCA conceptual framework.  These hypothetical systems 
demonstrated how a system could be operated at each LHCA.  The functional analysis 
showed how cognitive tasks associated with tele-robotic control are allocated between the 
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system and the operator at each LHCA.  With each increase in LHCA, more cognitive 
tasks were allocated to the system, alleviating the operator from those task.   
4. Breadth of Applicability of the LHCA framework 
A major purpose of the LHCA conceptual framework is to provide a means for 
classifying the level of detail of control inputs an operator provides to a tele-robot or 
vehicle.  Therefore, it is important to the LHCA framework’s validity that a wide variety 
of vehicle and tele-robotic control methods can be classified.  This requirement was 
successfully demonstrated by categorizing a variety of vehicle’s and telerobotic control 
configurations across domains.  In total, 42 real-world and hypothetical control 
configurations across six domains were categorized within the LHCA framework.  The 
domains were: automobile, fixed wing aircraft, wheeled/treaded UGV, legged UGV, 
fixed wing UAV, and multi-rotor UAV.  While the control configurations categorized 
were obviously not exhaustive, they do demonstrate that the LHCA framework can be 
applied to classify a wide variety of control configurations relevant to systems in motion.   
 
5. Trends and Findings Regarding LHCA 
To demonstrate that the LHCA framework is useful, trends and conclusions about 
control configurations associated with each level are important to understand.  During 
analysis, two primary trends emerged: 1) as LHCA increases, the required level of human 
mental and physical effort, as well as attention decreases and 2) as LHCA increases 
operational flexibility decreases.  In addition to the overall trends, each LHCA has 
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associated traits.  Those traits may make control of a system at a particular LHCA 
desirable for a user’s needs.  These traits and conclusion are described below.   
Furthermore, during this research some notable topics related to LHCA were 
exposed.  Discussion on liability and accountability issues related to LHCA, how mission 
requirements can affect the appropriate LHCA, the relationship between system 
complexity and LHCA, and the relationship between LoA and LHCA add additional 
insight to this analysis.  
 
LHCA, Responsibilities, and Human Attentiveness 
Every system has an associated set of responsibilities delegated to either the 
operator or the system to ensure effective operation.  As LHCA increases, responsibilities 
are reassigned from the operator to the system.  This reduction in operator responsibility 
directly leads to a reduction in the number of required human control inputs.  
Correspondingly, the amount of required human attention decreases as LHCA increases 
because operator responsibility decreases.  As the level of detail of control inputs 
decreases the operator can devote less attention to controlling the motion of the system.  
The decrease in human attention may correlate to a decrease in workload and the ability 
to dedicate attention to other duties, including maintaining SA or other system aspects.  
Follow on research should investigate these potential relationships.   
At LHCA 1 and 2 continuous control inputs are required.  The operator must be 
able to continually monitor some aspect of the system or environment and remain 
constantly physically engaged with the system, which requires a high degree of attention.  
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The implication of this is easily illustrated with car accident statistics because most cars 
are operated at LHCA 1.  According to the United States Department of Transportation 
10% of all fatal crashes in 2014 involved a distracted driver (Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration & Department of Transportation, 2014).  In these accidents, the amount 
of attention devoted to the task of driving by the vehicle operators dropped below the 
required threshold at the time of the accident. 
At LHCA 3, the operator provides discrete control inputs.  Some responsibilities 
have been delegated to the system at LHCA 3, such as maintaining parameters, but the 
operator remains fully responsible for monitoring the system during operation.  This 
allows the operator some freedom to reallocate attention away from the task of 
controlling the system.  For example, a pilot may briefly review airfield specific landing 
procedures while operating an aircraft at LHCA 3 during the cruise phase of flight.  In 
this scenario, the pilot is still responsible for ground and aircraft collision avoidance, but 
because those hazards are predictable and low threat when properly deconflicted, the 
pilot can split attention between system operation and landing preparation.   
When operating at LHCA 4 and 5, control of the motion of the vehicle requires 
even less attention from the operator because safety monitoring tasks have also been 
delegated to the system.  A great example of this is a video capture multi-rotor UAV 
tracking the operator as they engage in a recreational activity.  Once the system is 
activated, the operator may be skiing or rock-climbing, devoting no attention whatsoever 
to the system.  The operator is completely free to complete other tasks while the system 
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maintains video tracking, ground/obstacle avoidance, and battery/fuel monitoring 
responsibilities. 
 
LHCA and Operational Flexibility 
Another major trend is the correlation between LHCA and operational flexibility.  
In this context, the term operational flexibility refers to a system’s ability to be used as 
required by the operator, even if that is outside of normal operations.  At LHCA 1, the 
operator has complete control over the system; at LHCA 5, the operator is not even 
required to know what a system is doing on a moment-to-moment basis and the system 
may not be able to perform tasks it was not initially designed for.  At higher LHCA the 
operator may not be able to provide a fine enough level of detail of control inputs to 
accomplish a mission as desired.  Therefore, there is a negative correlation between 
LHCA and operational flexibility. 
In his book, The Design of Everyday Things, Norman discusses a concept very 
similar to this negative correlation between LHCA and flexibility.  He compares a 
concept of activity-centered controls to one of device-centered controls.  Activity-
centered controls are controls where inputs are provided based on the mode of operation.  
Device-centered controls are controls where inputs are given based on a system’s sub-
system metrics.  Norman’s activity-centered controls are equivalent to operating a system 
in LHCA 4, providing goals the system should achieve. Whereas Norman’s device-
centered controls are more like LHCA 1, providing inputs directly to how a system’s 
components should behave.  As Norman points out, activity-centered controls are very 
 
87 
convenient when a system is operating normally, but can be frustrating and limit the 
flexibility of a system when abnormal operations are required (Norman, 2013).  
Consider a case where a test of an aircraft’s stall performance was desired.  An 
example of a LHCA 2 system might be a stall protection system, preventing the operator 
from stalling the aircraft by mandating thrust and pitch limits.  If the stall protection 
system were active on the aircraft when stall performance was to be tested the operator 
would need to disable the system before the test could be performed.  In this example, the 
LHCA must be reduced to provide the flexibility required to accomplish the desired test 
mission.   
Another example of the loss of flexibility at higher LHCA is the F-16 Auto-
GCAS.  This system will prevent a gear up landing by initiating a pull up maneuver 
before touchdown.  However, if a malfunction were to occur to the aircraft’s landing gear 
and a gear-up landing was required to recover the aircraft, the Auto-GCAS system would 
interfere.  On 27 February, 2007 A Dutch F-16 Block 20 experienced a loss of nose gear 
during takeoff and needed to conduct a gear-up landing.  After the mishap, the aircraft 
was safely recovered, repaired, and returned to service (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2016a).  If the Auto-GCAS were enabled, with the system controlled at LHCA 3, the 
aircraft might not be permitted to conduct the required maneuver.   
As the LHCA for a system increases, more detailed decisions about how a system 
should behave are delegated to the system.  The removal of the operator from the 
decision loop reduces the operator’s ability to precisely control the system.  If a mission 
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is to operate outside of standard operating procedures, a lower LHCA may be required 
unless the system can be modified to support the alternate mission.  
 
LHCA, HSI, and Other Traits 
This section describes traits associated with each LHCA as well as some 
anticipated HSI effects of LHCA.  The anticipated HSI effects of LHCA were not 
verified in this research, but are posited to be present.  Follow on research should 
investigate the effects described in Table 8.   
When conducting a cost-benefit analysis the traits described above should be 
considered.  Table 8 could be used by system designers to select the appropriate 
LHCA(s) for a system under design.  It should be noted that these traits should be 
considered relative.  That is, if a particular system were to be configured to be operated at 
a LHCA, the traits apply relative to other configuration options.  The traits do not apply 
when comparing one system to another.  For example, an aircraft controlled at LHCA 3 
may require more training than an automobile controlled at LHCA 1.  However, an 
aircraft controlled exclusively at LHCA 3 would require less training than the same 
aircraft which is expected be controlled at LHCA 1.   
 
Table 8 – LHCA Traits 
  
 
Level of Human Control Abstraction 
1, Direct 
Control 
2, 
Augmented 
Control 
3, 
Parametric 
Control 
4, Goal 
Oriented 
Control 
5, Mission 
Capable 
Control 
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Operator 
Attention 
Required 
Maximum 
operator 
attention is 
required, the 
system will 
not provide 
any control 
assistance and 
the operator 
must be 
attentive.   
The operator 
must maintain 
constant 
awareness of 
the system 
and 
environment, 
some control 
assistance 
may reduce 
some peak 
attention 
scenarios.   
The operator 
may reduce 
attention to 
perform 
auxiliary 
tasks, 
however, 
remains 
responsible 
for system 
safety and 
must be 
available to 
intervene if 
necessary.   
The operator’s 
required 
attention is 
dramatically 
reduced.  The 
operator must 
be available to 
provide 
intermediate 
goals, but has 
relinquished 
safety 
responsibilities.   
The operator 
could 
potentially be 
completely 
inattentive of 
the system 
during the 
mission.   
Operator 
Control and 
System 
Flexibility 
Maximum 
control and 
flexibility is 
given to the 
operator. 
Operator 
maintains a 
high amount 
of control 
and 
flexibility, 
may not be 
suitable for 
some unique 
uses. 
The operator 
maintains 
control over 
most 
behavior of 
the system, 
but sacrifices 
precise 
control for 
less control 
inputs. 
Flexibility is 
dramatically 
reduced.  If 
the system is 
not pre-
programed or 
capable of self-
adaptation to 
complete a task 
it cannot be 
completed.   
Flexibility is 
reduced 
relative to 
LHCA 4.  The 
system must 
be 
preprogramed 
or capable of 
self-adaptation 
and the 
operator 
must know 
the full 
mission 
requirements 
before 
execution. 
Personnel 
Availability 
Maximum 
demand and 
responsibility 
is placed on 
operator, this 
may result in 
a smaller 
personnel 
pool to draw 
from. 
A high 
amount of 
responsibility 
is placed on 
the operator, 
personnel 
pool will 
remain 
reduced 
Constant 
attentiveness 
and a 'feel' for 
control of the 
system are 
not necessary, 
the personnel 
pool size 
increases 
over LHCA 
2. 
Personnel availability is greatly 
increased.  Virtually any 
responsible person who can 
select goals necessary to perform 
a mission should be able to 
operate the system.   
At LHCA 4 and 5 a single 
operator may be capable of 
controlling multiple systems 
simultaneously.  This could 
increase personnel availability.   
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System 
Knowledge 
and Training 
Requirements 
Training 
requirements 
will be 
highest at this 
level, the 
operator must 
understand 
precisely how 
the system 
functions for 
maximum 
effectiveness. 
Training 
requirements 
will remain 
high, but less 
understanding 
of subsystems 
is required. 
Training 
requirements 
are reduced 
because the 
operator does 
not need to 
gain muscle 
memory of 
control 
movements, 
system 
understanding 
is reduced to 
knowledge of 
system 
capabilities. 
Training 
requirements 
and system 
knowledge are 
both 
dramatically 
reduced.  The 
operator only 
needs to know 
the system's 
capabilities and 
mission 
requirements.   
System 
Knowledge 
and Training 
Requirements 
are the 
reduced 
below that of 
LHCA 4 
because an 
operator is not 
required to 
form sub-
mission goals. 
General 
Comments 
Unstable 
systems 
should not 
be operated 
at this level. 
In most 
applications 
where 
continuous 
control inputs 
are used, 
Augmented 
Control is 
desirable 
instead of 
Direct 
Control.  
However, the 
cost of 
implementing 
is usually 
greater than 
Direct 
Control.   
This LHCA is 
not suitable 
for 
applications 
where a high 
level of detail 
is required, 
the best use is 
applications 
where system 
parameter 
stability for a 
long period of 
time is 
desirable.   
During 
operations, it is 
possible the 
operator may 
be available 
for other 
tasks, 
depending on 
the time 
between 
intermediate 
goals assigned 
to the system.   
It is very 
likely that a 
single 
operator 
could control 
multiple 
systems at this 
LHCA 
because the 
operator will 
not be 
involved in 
system control 
unless a 
failure occurs 
 
 
Table 8 includes information on the correlation between LHCA and operator 
attention, operational flexibility, personnel availability, training requirements, and some 
general comments.  The negative correlations between LHCA and operator attention as 
well as operational flexibility were discussed in detail above.   
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A positive correlation between the available personnel pool and LHCA is 
anticipated because the demand on the operator is decreased as LHCA increases.  The 
number and challenge of physical and mental activities an operator must be capable of 
decreases as LHCA increases.  With less challenge, it is likely that more people will be 
able to operate a system with a higher LHCA.  This leads to a potentially larger pool of 
personnel to draw from to operate any given system.   
A negative correlation between LHCA and required system knowledge and 
required training is also anticipated.  With a more manual system the operator must have 
a better understanding of not only what a system can do, but how it functions.  This is 
because at a higher LHCA the system filters the operator’s control inputs, avoiding 
potential failure modes, but at lower LHCA the filters are removed.  At lower LHCA the 
operator must have a better understanding of how to avoid potential failures.  
Additionally, at LHCA 1 and 2, the operator is providing continuous control inputs, often 
these types of control inputs are associated with acquiring a skill to operate the system 
effectively.  Understanding not only how the system should move, but how the operator 
must move to effectively achieve those system movements can take time to perfect.  
Gaining a ‘feel’ for the controls and the associated muscle memory may take more time 
then entering discrete control inputs.   
The general comments described in Table 8 are conclusions that emerged from 
the discussion in Chapter 5.  The assertion that unstable systems should not be operated at 
LHCA 1 is justified because unstable systems such as the bipedal UGV and the B-2 must 
use at least LHCA 2 to avoid falling or crashing.  Generally, LHCA 2 is desirable over 
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LHCA 1 except when development of the control system cost is prohibitive.  This is 
because the operator is usually able to effectively maneuver the system as desired at 
LHCA 2 and often the challenge of operation would be reduced.  LHCA 3 is not suitable 
for applications where a high level of detail is required because the operator must 
repeatedly input discrete control inputs to achieve the goal.  The manipulation phase of 
the hypothetical EOD UGV was a good example of how operating a system at LHCA 3 
in a high detail environment can present challenges.  The general comment assertions 
about LHCA 4 and 5 are justified because of the reduced operator attention associated at 
LHCA 4 and 5.  With the task of system control demanding less of the operator’s 
attention at these LHCA, the operator may be available to perform other tasks or to 
operate more than a single vehicle. 
It should be noted, however, that this discussion assumes that a system employs 
only a single LHCA.  As was demonstrated with many of the real-world systems and all 
three of the hypothetical systems, often LHCA is dynamic, changing as appropriate 
during operations.  A designer may consider that by adding the capability of a system to 
be operated at additional LHCA, their system could be operated at each LHCA, as 
desired.  The operator could dynamically switch between LHCA at any given time, 
gaining the best traits from each LHCA for the situation.   
 
Discussion on Liability and Accountability Issues Related to LHCA 
Some confusion may arise when making the distinction between Parametric 
Control (LHCA 3) and Goal Oriented Control (LHCA 4) because of the potential 
 
93 
ambiguous distinction between responsibilities allocated to either the operator or the 
system.  This distinction is complicated further when legality and liability are involved.  
Aspects of control, authority to act, may be delegated to the system, but the operator may 
still be held accountable for the system’s performance.   
This is a major issue facing society at large as the capability arises to create 
systems which, from a technical perspective, could be operated at LHCA 4 or 5.  These 
systems may not be allowed to operate at LHCA 4 or 5, assigning safety related 
responsibly to the system, because of regulatory issues.  System manufacturers may never 
be willing to accept legal responsibility for their products actions, when their common 
use will involve delegating all control authority to the system.   
Part of the purpose of the LHCA framework is to provide a lens through which 
the way a system is controlled can be considered, resulting in clear and meaningful 
distinctions between levels from the operator’s perspective.  The distinctions between the 
levels are intended to not be a technical assessment of how a system functions, but how 
the operator controls it.  The important distinction between liability for accidents falling 
on the system operator, or not, incentivizes a certain level of attentiveness from the 
operator.   
This generates an issue for the LHCA framework, the technical capabilities of 
systems enable possible operations at LHCA 4 or 5, but regulations and a clear 
understanding of how to ensure safety are currently lagging.  For example, many 
automated driving features alleviate control tasks from the operator without accepting 
any legal responsibility.  A case in point is Tesla Motors’ Enhanced Autopilot feature 
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which can replace the operator’s steering, throttle, and brake control inputs, leaving the 
operator with no continuous control inputs while the system is activated.  At the same 
time, Tesla does not legally accept responsibility for car accidents caused while the 
system is activated.  While the system may, now or in the near future, be technically 
capable of being allocated safety related tasks, and indeed has even been allocated all 
control tasks, the system cannot be considered to be operating at LHCA 4 because safety 
responsibilities have not been removed from the operator.   
The DJI Phantom described earlier may operate at LHCA 4 and 5 because the 
operator is issuing commands in a Goal or Mission oriented manor.  However, accident 
accountability is unclear in at this point.  For example, the 2016 FAA document intended 
to regulate small UAS operations states “Autonomous operations have numerous 
practical applications, including agricultural operations, aerial photography, and search 
and rescue. The FAA agrees with the commenters who pointed out that the ability for a 
small unmanned aircraft to fly autonomously could add significant utility to a small UAS 
operation and would further encourage innovation in the industry. Accordingly, this rule 
will allow the autonomous flight of small unmanned aircraft.”  Assignment of liability in 
the case of an accident with an autonomous UAS was not addressed, however the FAA 
emphasized that the operator must be able to command the UAS to land, if required.  
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2016b)   
The severity of a mishap may be a large factor in this area.  A small UGV 
traveling at a low velocity may have very little safety related concerns and therefore an 
operator may be willing to decrease the level of detail of control inputs to LHCA 4 more 
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easily.  As autonomous systems and their operations are further developed, this will be a 
key point of interest.  A social, legal, or regulatory system must be developed before 
operations at LHCA 4 or 5 will be made available for a broad variety of systems.   
 
Discussion of Mission Requirements and LHCA 
The majority of the discussion relating to LHCA was associated with different 
configurations of systems because a system’s available control inputs affect LHCA.  
However, mission requirements may also affect which LHCA is possible and optimal.  
The amount of information available to an operator before a mission will affect whether 
LHCA 5 is an option.  For an operator to control a system at LHCA 5 they must know 
generally what must be done during a mission, but that is not always the case.   
Consider a common dynamic ground support mission a bomber might fly over 
hostile territory.  The aircraft may be assigned to enter a holding pattern over an area 
where combat is expected, then await further orders to support ground operations.  The 
bomber may drop no ordinance or may drop all its ordinance, possibly even meeting up 
with an aerial refueling tanker to extend its mission if required.  This type of dynamic 
mission where the mission requires follow-on orders is not possible at LHCA 5 because 
intermediate orders are core to the mission.   
 
Discussion on System Complexity and LHCA 
Interestingly, the complexity of a control system is not a factor in determining the 
LHCA a system is controlled at.  For example, the CMU HRP was operated at LHCA 2, 
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enabled by an algorithm which determined how the system moved.  This complex 
algorithm, which was technically challenging to implement, enabled the system to 
operate only at LHCA 2, even though many autopilot systems are much simpler and 
provide a LHCA 3.  Similarly, the fly-by-wire systems discussed earlier are complex and 
take many sensors with complex algorithms to implement, but again are operated at 
LHCA 2 while more simplistic systems, which simply regulate parameters are operated at 
LHCA 3.  This is because the level of detail of control inputs provided by the human is 
higher with the LHCA 2 systems than with the LHCA 3 systems.  It is important to 
remember that the LHCA conceptual framework focuses on the operator’s control inputs, 
not the technical complexity of the system being controlled.   
 
Relationship between LoA and LHCA 
The relationship between LoA and LHCA seems to have a loose positive 
correlation.  LoA has a focus on the authority granted to a system to make a decision 
without human verification of that decision.  LHCA has a focus on the level of detail of 
decisions made by the operator. Thus, from a system design perspective, LoA is focused 
on operator oversight, whereas LHCA is focused on human-machine 
interface/communication. For LoA and LHCA, the low and high end of the scales are 
very similar (assuming that LoA is applied to a control system of a system in motion): 
systems are controlled completely manually or completely autonomously.  However, the 
increments between are quite different.   
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The LoA framework is designed to apply more broadly then the LHCA 
framework.  The LoA framework can be useful in describing the level of automation for a 
range of technologies which implement some function that could be performed by a 
human.  However, the LHCA framework has the limited scope focusing on vehicles and 
tele-robotics and applies at the system level or system state level.  That is LHCA is not 
defined when analyzing a technology which automates as subfunction in the functional 
hierarchy associated with controlling the motion of systems. 
Other differences between these frameworks are the focus, differentiations 
between levels, and the fact that the LoA framework does not evaluate the types of 
decisions it is assessing.  The focus of the LoA framework is the system while the focus 
the LHCA framework is on the operator.  The differentiations between levels in the LoA 
framework are determined by the required oversight the system requires while the LHCA 
framework focuses on the level of detail of decisions made by the operator.  Finally, the 
LoA framework does not evaluate the type of decision which is automated, while the 
types of decisions allocated to the system or the operator are very important in assessing 
a LHCA.   
This is not to say the that LoA framework is not useful in assessing system 
effectiveness.  There are applications where the proper oversight of decisions made by a 
system is an important trait that must be discussed.  For example, if an autonomous UAV 
were to be sent on a strike mission to attack a ground target, it is probably appropriate to 
have some human oversight within the kill-chain.  That level of human oversight can be 
described with the LoA framework.  Leadership may decide to require a human have veto 
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power over the decision to fire, LoA 6.  Alternatively, leadership may decide that the 
appropriate oversight for the human operator to initiate the ‘fire’ decision, LoA 5.  In 
either of these cases the LoA framework describes exactly that type of human oversight.  
Another example where a different level of operator oversight would be appropriate is a 
missile defense system.  Likely, leadership would want to allocate a large amount of 
autonomy to the system and not require operator oversight to initiate countermeasures.  
Therefore, LoA of 10 might be specified as a design constraint. 
The two frameworks, LoA and LHCA, describe different aspects of controlling a 
system and both have their place.  LoA describes the authority granted to a system, 
whereas LHCA describes the level of detail of control inputs provided by the operator.   
 
6. Evaluation of LHCA as a Scientific Theory  
By applying the criteria developed by Jacobs and Grainger just as de Winter did 
to evaluate Fitts list, the LHCA conceptual framework can be evaluated as a scientific 
theory (de Winter & Dodou, 2014).  Unfortunately, as this document introduces the 
LHCA framework, not all the criteria can be applied.  Specifically, the interpretability of 
the LHCA framework cannot yet be evaluated because the framework has not been 
applied by other researchers.  Further, generalizability cannot be fully evaluated as 
unknown systems have yet to be generated.  Follow-on research should evaluate these 
aspects of the framework.  The other remaining criteria were assessed below: 
Plausibility – The primary assumption of this research is that as the LHCA 
increases the amount of operator attention required for system control decreases.  This 
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decrease in required operator attention will likely result in a reduction in workload.  This 
is consistent with Endsley’s concept of Control Granularity (Endsley, 2015).  In addition, 
the transfer of cognitive tasks from the operator to the system is assumed to result in a 
reduction in workload for the operator as is consistent with the workload modeling 
literature.  This consistency with other research suggests that the LHCA framework is 
plausible.  
Explanatory adequacy – The framework lays out a basis for which the control of 
systems can be categorized by the level of detail of control inputs provided by the 
operator.  This concept is consistent with the concepts discussed by Chen et al. (2007),  
Endsley (2015), and Milgram et al. (1995).   
Simplicity – The framework consists of five levels and has been shown to permit 
the classification of 42 system control configurations within 11 different systems within 7 
different domains through the application of a decision tree having only four questions.  
There are also not a series of exceptions and situational rules which would add 
complexity to the framework. 
Descriptive Adequacy – The framework categorized the control of systems across 
domains.  Those categorizations were useful and had meaning because conclusions about 
a system operating at a LHCA could be drawn.  Those conclusions were reasonable and 
aligned with data observed about the operation of those systems.   
Generalizability – The framework was used to classify many systems, including 
hypothetical systems.  At this point, it is not possible to say that the LHCA framework is 
generalizable to any future vehicles or tele-robotic systems.  However, it is conceivable 
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that the framework could be applied to existing and foreseeable future systems within its 
scope.   
The LHCA framework has been shown to meet five of the six criteria established 
by Jacobs and Granger and applied by de Winter (de Winter & Dodou, 2014; Fitts, 1951; 
Jacobs & Grainger, 1994).  The sixth criteria, interpretability, should be evaluated with 
follow-on research.   
 
7. Summary of Analysis 
This analysis covered the assessing of LHCA for both real world and hypothetical 
systems, the effect of LHCA on system level traits, and LHCA evaluated as a scientific 
theory.  It was shown that the LHCA can be applied broadly and the LHCA of a control 
configuration does have a system level effect.  The evaluation of the LHCA conceptual 
framework as a scientific theory showed that, while interpretability has not yet been 
assessed, the LHCA framework has an acceptable academic pedigree.   
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VI.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. Introduction of Conclusions 
This chapter will summarize the results and overall conclusions of this research.  
The LHCA conceptual framework will be evaluated against the recommendations of the 
DSB (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology Logistics, 
2012).  Finally, recommendations for follow-on research into the LHCA conceptual 
framework are proposed.   
 
2. LHCA Alignment with DSB Recommendations 
As discussed in chapter 1, the DSB proposed developing a framework that 
focused on capabilities, cognitive functional allocation, and the trade-space of a system 
operating at different levels within the framework (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Technology Logistics, 2012).  The LHCA conceptual framework 
was intended to adhere to these recommendations as closely as possible, providing a 
useful tool to the DoD.   
The LHCA framework is designed to categorize the control of a system, therefor 
it is only able to express the capabilities of a system relating to the control of that system.  
A capability desired by the DoD is the ability to control multiple tele-robots 
simultaneously by a single operator (US DoD, 2005).  As discussed previously, a system 
controlled at LHCA 4 or 5 could potentially be operated in this way because the demands 
on the operator’s attention are relatively low.  The LHCA framework applies broadly to 
vehicles and tele-robotic systems and these systems may have a myriad of capabilities.  
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The framework does not have a focus on evaluating the capabilities of a system, but 
within the range of control capabilities the LHCA adequately describes capabilities.   
The LHCA focuses heavily on the functional allocation of cognitive tasks 
between the operator and the system.  The very definitions of each level revolve around 
the level of detail of tasks that are allocated to the operator verses the system.  The LHCA 
framework aligns well with this recommendation by the DSB.   
As recommended by the DSB any useful framework must be able to make the 
system level trades visible.  The LHCA framework achieves this goal through the initial 
correlations between LHCA and both operational flexibility and operator attention.  It is 
also postulated that there are many other system level trades which could be made visible 
using the LHCA framework, especially in the field of HSI.  Follow-on research is 
recommended to determine what the full trade-space is, but a foundation of potential 
system level trades at different levels of the LHCA has been established. 
In conclusion, the LHCA framework fulfills the functional allocation and system 
level trade recommendations from the DSB.  The narrow scope of control capabilities can 
also be assessed with the LHCA framework.  Overall, the LHCA framework generally 
meets the requirements for an alternative to the LoA framework as recommended by the 
DSBs and can be used by the DoD and others as a tool when assessing human control of 
systems or when developing design requirements.   
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3. Proposed Follow-On Research 
There are several opportunities for follow on research on the subject of LHCA.  
Research into potential HSI and human performance effects described in Table 8 is 
highly recommended.  Quantitative research should be used to verify and categorized the 
intensity of these effects.  As discussed above, a correlation between required operator 
attention and LHCA exists, it is likely that the reduction in required operator attention 
will correlate to a reduction in operator workload.   
Research into the effect of LHCA on SA should also be conducted.  The 
relationship between LHCA and SA may be complex.  The operator’s SA may be 
considered to have layers of detail similar to the concept of LHCA.  For example, if the 
operator is flying an aircraft at LHCA 1, the operator may notice a tendency for the 
aircraft to drift in a certain direction.  This drift may be negated by auto-trim features 
associated with LHCA 2.  Therefore, an operator may lose SA on this very detailed 
aspect of aircraft performance.  In contrast, if an operator were controlling an aircraft at 
LHCA 4, they may be able to maintain higher SA regarding the operational context.  By 
focusing less on the details of the aircraft’s performance, the operator may be able to 
have a better SA on the mission as a whole.  Further research into both the concept of 
level of detail of SA and the effect of LHCA on that SA should be pursued.   
Another area of research to be pursued in this area is the concept of level of detail 
of control inputs provided by the operator as applied outside the scope of vehicles and 
tele-robotics as examined in this research.  An example of a system which could be 
assessed within the LHCA framework but is not a vehicle or tele-robotic system is a 
home thermostat.  A home thermostat could be considered to receive parametric control 
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inputs, turning on and of aspects of a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system to 
regulate temperature.  Another example is a handheld pistol-grip drill.  This system could 
be considered to receive direct control inputs, the position of the trigger setting the 
precise motor power.  This system may be considered to have augmented control if a 
torque clutch is added, where an operator specifies the maximum torque of the drill and 
the drill automatically disengages if that torque is reached.  These concepts of level of 
detail of control inputs may be applicable more broadly then examined in this research 
and should be explored further. 
Finally, a simple test of interpretability for the LHCA framework should be 
conducted.  The proposed experiment would provide descriptions of control 
configurations and ask participants to classify an operator’s LHCA.  The robustness and 
repeatability of the LHCA framework could be tested in this experiment, demonstrating 
that the LHCA framework is understandable and interpretable.  This test would be 
designed to show if a control system would be classified consistently within the LHCA 
framework independent of the person classifying the system.   
 
4. Summary of Significant Findings & Insights 
This research proposed a conceptual framework for analyzing the level of detail 
of control inputs an operator provides to vehicle and tele-robotic systems.  The 
framework itself was then examined, showing that it could be applied both broadly and 
had the ability to make system level traits visible.  The framework was also evaluated as 
a scientific theory, meeting all five of the criteria examined.  Finally, the LHCA was 
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assessed against the DSB’s recommendations.  The framework was shown to illustrate 
control related capabilities, show cognitive task allocation between the operator and the 
system, and make system level traits visible. 
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